Beyond known worlds:climate change governance by arbitral tribunals? by Vadi, Valentina
Beyond Known Worlds: Climate 









  Can economic development and the fight against climate 
change be integrated successfully? What role, if any, does 
international investment law play in global climate governance? 
Can foreign direct investments (FDI) be tools in the struggle 
against climate change? What types of claims have foreign 
investors brought with regard to climate change-related 
regulatory measures before investment treaty arbitral tribunals? 
This Article examines the specific question as to whether foreign 
direct investments can mitigate and/or aggravate climate 
change. The interplay between climate change and foreign direct 
investments is largely underexplored and in need of 
systematization. To map this nexus, this Article proceeds as 
follows. First, it examines the conceptualization of climate as a 
global public good. Second, it considers it as an environmental 
issue. Third, it scrutinizes its conceptualization as a human 
rights issue. Fourth, it explores critical legal issues raised by the 
complex interplay between climate change and foreign direct 
investments. Fifth, it critically assesses several current case 
studies. Sixth, the Article will present some legal tools to achieve 
a balance between the different interests at stake. The 
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 With temperatures constantly rising since the industrial 
revolution, climate change has brought extreme heat waves, 
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decreased global food stocks, depleted ecosystems and biodiversity, 
and a raised sea level.1 Originally perceived as only an environmental 
issue, climate change, defined as any change in climate over time 
(whether due to natural factors or as a result of human activity), has 
become a pressing global concern.2 Climate change can affect diverse 
determinants of human well-being, such as access to water, energy 
supplies, and public health, and can determine social disruptions, 
such as migration due to drought or rising sea levels and loss of 
traditional livestock and habitat.3  
 Because climate change is a common concern of mankind4 and 
can affect populations regardless of state boundaries, a wide range of 
international, regional, and national regimes governs various aspects 
of the same. To a large extent, this multilevel regulatory framework 
or “regime complex”5 gives rise to a sort of lex climatica, or climate 
change law. Climate change law is a good example of multipolar law: 
national, regional, and international law address this challenge.6 As a 
complex phenomenon, climate change “is best addressed at multiple 
scales and levels.”7 Yet, while different institutions are formulating 
responses, much remains to be done to ensure coherent, effective, and 
                                                                                                                            
 1.  See NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE 
CLIMATE 13–14 (2014) (highlighting possible repercussions resulting from climate 
change, including crop depletion, droughts, flooding, wildfires, and disease). 
 2.  See U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Report of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship 
Between Climate Change and Human Rights, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 
2009), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/103/44/PDF/G0910344.pdf? 
OpenElement [http://perma.cc/QLD8-RSJW] (archived Sept. 19, 2015) (defining climate 
change as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human 
activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to 
natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”).  
 3.  See Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change, Differentiated Responsibilities and 
State Responsibility: Devising Novel Legal Strategies for Damage Caused by Climate 
Change, in CLIMATE LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 37 (Benjamin J. Richardson et 
al. eds., 2009); see also Ann Powers & Christopher Stucko, Introducing the Law of the 
Sea and the Legal Implications of Rising Sea Levels, in THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS: 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 123, 123–24 (Michael 
B. Gerrard & Gregory E. Wannier eds., 2013) (“[R]esidents of . . . inhabited islands are 
abandoning their homes as rising tides continue to render more land uninhabitable.”). 
 4.  See generally Thomas Cottier & Sofya Matteotti-Berkutova, International 
Environmental Law and the Evolving Concept of Common Concern of Mankind, in 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION AND THE MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 21–47 
(Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2009). 
 5.  See Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for 
Climate Change, DISCUSSION PAPER 10-33 1 (2010) (defining “regime complex” as “a 
loosely coupled set of specific regimes”). 
 6.  See discussion infra Sections III, IV (providing specific examples of 
regional, national, and international laws and how they function separately and 
together).  
 7.  Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change, 
BACKGROUND PAPER TO THE 2010 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT abs. (2009). 
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holistic approaches to the issue, and a coordinated international 
response is missing. Moreover, different domains of public 
international law govern different aspects of climate change.  
 Against this background, this Article examines whether 
economic development as spurred by foreign direct investments (FDI) 
can mitigate and/or exacerbate climate change. In particular, it 
explores the complex interplay between climate change and foreign 
direct investments on two critical issues. First, the Article addresses 
the question as to whether FDI can be a tool in the struggle against 
climate change.8 Second, it investigates the parallel question as to 
whether regulatory measures relating to climate change can affect 
investors’ rights.  
 Consider the following scenario.9 The government of Ruritania, 
an industrialized country, adopts policies to promote investment in 
renewable energy sources, creating a Feed-in-Tariff Program that 
sets up a twenty-year fixed price to be paid for energy from renewable 
sources including wind, hydroelectric, solar, and other types of 
renewable energy. In view of this favorable regulatory environment, 
Windpower, a foreign company from Marmorica, plans to develop a 
successful offshore wind facility in the area of Planasia, an island 
located in the territorial waters of Ruritania. Wind assessments have 
shown that the wind speeds in the Planasia area are high and steady 
due to the lack of mountains on the island. In fact, Planasia’s highest 
point stands 22 m (72 ft) above sea level. It is thus likely that within 
a century Planasia’s land will become subject to increased soil 
salination and will be largely submerged. Ruritania and Windpower 
sign a contract for the development of the offshore power plant. 
However, local communities vigorously oppose wind turbines. On the 
one hand, indigenous communities contend that sacred sites lying 
underwater would be jeopardized by the operation of wind turbines. 
On the other hand, local communities contest the development of the 
project close to Planasia, as this island is located in an area that is 
listed as a UNESCO biosphere due to its unique biological and 
environmental features. The government of Ruritania places a 
moratorium on the further development of the offshore wind 
development on the grounds that further scientific research has to be 
completed before the project can proceed. The company, however, files 
an investor–state arbitration against Ruritania under the 
                                                                                                                            
 8.  See Andrew Newcombe, Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty 
Law, 8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 357, 357–360 (2007) (examining the linkage between 
international investment law and sustainable development). See generally BRADLEY 
CONDON & TAPEN SINHA, THE ROLE OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE (1st ed. 2013).  
 9.  This scenario combines different elements from various investment 
arbitrations. See discussion infra Part VI (providing an in-depth analysis of pending 
investment disputes). 
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Marmorica–Ruritania bilateral investment treaty, contending that 
Ruritania has indirectly expropriated its investment. Has Ruritania 
unlawfully expropriated Windpower’s investment, thus breaching the 
relevant investment treaty provision? Can Ruritania legitimately 
adopt measures to protect the cultural and religious sites of 
indigenous peoples? Should the promotion of green energy be 
prioritized vis-à-vis other environmental concerns?   
 The above scenario is but one example of the complex interplay 
between climate change and foreign direct investments. Despite the 
upsurge in arbitrations at the crossroads between investment and 
climate change, the interplay between climate change and foreign 
direct investments remains underexplored and in need of 
systematization. Climate change has introduced a new dimension in 
the balancing of competing interests in international investment law 
and arbitration, whereby measures to address climate change are 
sometimes to be assessed and balanced against competing economic 
interests. Investigating the nexus between FDI and climate change is 
both timely and important because it can contribute to current 
debates on environmental governance. Moreover, climate change can 
be seen as a harbinger of broader debates and choices about the 
future of international investment governance. This Article aims at 
mapping this linkage, investigating it through the prism of 
international investment law and arbitration. 
 International investment law constitutes an important part of 
public international law governing foreign direct investment.10 The 
sources of international investment law include international 
investment treaties; customary rules of international law protecting 
the rights of aliens; general principles of law; and—as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law—previous awards, 
judicial decisions and legal scholarship. As there is still no single 
comprehensive global treaty, investor rights are mainly defined by 
almost 3,000 international investment agreements (IIAs) that are 
signed by two or more states and are governed by public international 
law.11 Under such treaties, state parties agree to provide a certain 
                                                                                                                            
 10.  For an historical overview, see generally ANDREAS LOWENFELD, 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 469–94 (2d ed. 2008); ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS 
PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 1 (2009); JESWALD W. 
SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES (1st ed. 2010); M. SORNARAJAH, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 19–28 (3d ed. 2010). See generally JOSÉ 
E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT (2011) (arguing that the international community has only recently 
determined that international rules are essential for governing foreign direct 
investment).  
 11.  See generally UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011 (2011) (explaining 
that the number of international investment agreements continues to grow, adding 
complexity to the global investment regime).  
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degree of protection to investors who are nationals of contracting 
states, including compensation in case of expropriation, fair and 
equitable treatment, most favored nation treatment, and full 
protection and security, among others. At the procedural level, most 
investment treaties allow foreign investors to file arbitral claims 
directly against the host state. This is a major novelty in 
international law as investors are not required to exhaust local 
remedies and no longer depend on diplomatic protection to defend 
their interests against the host state. Investment treaty arbitration is 
often selected as the adjudicatory model to settle investment 
disputes. The claims are heard by ad hoc arbitral tribunals whose 
arbitrators are selected by the disputing parties and/or appointing 
institutions. Depending on the arbitral rules chosen, the proceedings 
occur in camera and the very existence of the claim and the final 
award may never become public. 
 As climate change and foreign direct investments are governed 
by different legal instruments, their interplay can be examined from 
different analytical and legal perspectives, including international 
climate change law12 and international investment law. There can be 
possible convergences and/or divergences between various rules 
governing this interaction.13 The Article explores the linkage between 
climate change and foreign direct investments from an international 
investment law perspective.  
 While some investment law scholars have addressed some 
aspects of the interplay between climate change and international 
investment law,14 no study has focused on the emerging arbitrations 
in which foreign investors have alleged that the host state has 
breached investment treaty provisions by adopting or repealing 
regulation to prevent climate change. These arbitrations raise a 
number of critical issues. How should power be allocated between 
national and international levels of governance? Is investor–state 
                                                                                                                            
 12.  See generally DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
LAW (2014). 
 13.  James Harrison, The Case for Investigative Legal Pluralism in 
International Economic Law Linkage Debate: A Strategy for Enhancing the Value of 
International Legal Discourse, 2 LONDON REV. INT’L LAW 115–45 (2014).  
 14.  See Daniel M. Firger & Michael B. Gerrard, Harmonizing Climate Change 
Policy and International Investment Law: Threats, Challenges and Opportunities, Y.B. 
INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 1 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2011) (discussing how national and 
transnational regulations often conflict with international investment laws); Stephan 
W. Schill, Do Investment Treaties Chill Unilateral State Regulation to Mitigate Climate 
Change?, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 469, 469–77 (2007) (discussing the question as to whether 
investment governance can chill unilateral state regulation to mitigate climate 
change); Freya Baetens, Foreign Investment Law and Climate Change, 6–9 
(Sustainable Development Law on Climate Change Legal Working Paper Series, Paper 
No. 1, 2010) (analyzing the relationship between the Kyoto Protocol and foreign 
investments). 
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arbitration the best forum to adjudicate climate change-related 
disputes? What is the role of arbitral tribunals in global climate 
governance? By imposing liability for monetary damages where 
government actions violate international obligations, arbitral 
tribunals can and do have a significant impact on national legislative 
bodies, administrations, and courts. This study aims to feed into and 
inform the ongoing debate on the role of foreign direct investments in 
the climate change discourse. Is comprehensive regulatory change 
necessary in order to foster environmentally sound development and 
mitigate climate change?  
 The Article proceeds as follows. First, it conceptualizes climate 
as a global public good. Second, it investigates the conceptualization 
of climate change as an environmental issue and the relevant legal 
framework. Third, it examines the conceptualization of climate 
change as a human rights issue. Fourth, it illustrates the regime 
complex governing climate change. Fifth, it discusses the interplay 
between climate change and foreign direct investments in the light of 
the current international investment regime. Some relevant investor–
state arbitrations will be surveyed. Sixth, the Article will examine 
some legal tools to achieve a balance between the different interests 
at stake. The conclusion will then sum up the key findings of the 
study. 
II. CLIMATE AS A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD 
 Climate—from the ancient Greek klima, meaning inclination15—
is commonly defined as “the average of weather over time and 
space.”16 It can be categorized as a global public good, given the 
collective benefits it provides, as well as its global character.17 Global 
                                                                                                                            
 15.  See Rolf-Bernhard Essig, Climate, Eco and Green Technology: How 
Environmental Problems Are Reflected in Language, http://www.goethe.de/ges/umw/ 
prj/kuk/the/kul/es11261797.htm  [http://perma.cc/4L5U-UQJF] (archived Sept. 19, 
2015) (“When people in Ancient Greece referred to ‘klima’, they did not mean a 
combination of temperature, air pressure, wind speed, humidity and hours of sunshine: 
they meant the tilt of the Earth’s axis.”). 
 16.  NASA, Administrator, NASA—What's the Difference Between Weather and 
Climate?, NASA (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/noaa-n/climate/ 
climate_weather.html [http://perma.cc/69BT-C482] (archived Sept. 19, 2015) (defining 
climate as “the average of weather over time and space”). 
 17.  See Tomer Broude, Warming to Crisis: The Climate Change Law of 
Unintended Opportunity, NETH. Y.B. INT’L LAW 111, 116 (2013) (“[C]limate change 
mitigation [is] deemed ‘a quintessential global public good’ that presents itself to 
many . . . as an almost prototypical collective action problem.”); Timothy Meyer, Global 
Public Goods, Governance Risk, and International Energy, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
319, 323 (2012) (“Mitigating climate change is an example of a public good.”); Todd 
Sandler, Intergenerational Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS—INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999) (discussing 
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public goods present two main features: (1) publicness, and (2) a 
global nature.18 With regard to the first feature, the concept of public 
goods traces its roots back to antiquity, originating in the writings of 
Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero (res publica).19 According to current 
economic literature, “public goods” indicate goods that are 
nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.20 Nonrivalry is the ability of 
multiple consumers to consume the same good; and Nonexcludability 
means that no one can be excluded from using the good. Climate 
presents the features of a (global) common good as it provides 
collective benefits as well as inter- and intragenerational spillovers. 
Everybody can enjoy it without reducing the enjoyment of this good 
by others.21 Common examples of public goods include lighthouses,22 
clean air, and environmental goods, among others. The second feature 
of global public goods, their global character, is given by the fact that 
their benefits are almost universal in terms of countries, peoples, and 
generations.23 Certainly, climate defies traditional notions of 
territorial sovereignty. Climate is a common and shared 
environmental resource that is both within and beyond the 
jurisdiction of every state.  
 As a public good, climate cannot easily be provided by the 
“invisible hand” of the market. Rather, a global economic system built 
on resource extraction and consumption has spurred climate change. 
Human induced climate change has been conceived as “the biggest 
market failure the world has ever seen.”24 Because of the key features 
of public goods, “the market alone is often unable to ensure their 
efficient provision,”25 requiring some form of governmental 
                                                                                                                            
intergenerational public goods (i.e. assets that generate benefits for subsequent 
generations)). See generally SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE?: THE INCENTIVE TO 
SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS (2010) (explaining that the challenges in encouraging 
states to mitigate climate change are in part a result of the tragedy of the commons).  
 18.  See Inge Kaul et al., Defining Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC 
GOODS, supra note 17, at 2–3 (1999).  
 19.  See Manuel Velasquez et al., The Common Good, 5 ISSUES IN ETHICS 1, 1 
(1992). 
 20.  See Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. 
ECON. & STATS. 387 (1954). 
 21.  See generally Severine Deneulin & Nicholas Townsend, Public Goods, 
Global Public Goods and the Common Good, 34 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 19 (2007). 
 22.  See Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 
357–76 (1974) (asserting that a lighthouse is a public good because ships do not pay for 
the benefit provided to them from privately-funded operation of the lighthouse).  
 23.  See Kaul, supra note 18, at 3. See generally Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate 
Change ‘International’? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 
585 (2009). 
 24.  Michèle B. Bättig & Thomas Bernauer, National Institutions and Global 
Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy?, 63 INT’L 
ORG. 281, 281 (2009). 
 25.  U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Public Goods for 
Economic Development, at 6 (2008), https://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/ 
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intervention.26 International regulation allows states to address the 
shortcomings of national regulation27 because nations and regions 
may not fully, or sufficiently, appreciate the value of climate as a 
global public good. 
 According to mainstream economic literature, two main 
problems affect the provision of public goods: (1) free riding, and (2) 
the prisoner’s dilemma.28 Free riding refers to the powerful incentive 
to avoid contributing personal resources to common endeavors. Let us 
consider the following example. While a number of states have 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol,29 other states are reluctant to do so, 
fearing that by ratifying it they could affect profitable industries. A 
state can seek to “free ride” by allowing others to commit themselves 
to a binding regime, and then allowing its nationals to exploit finite 
resources. Moreover, even if states ratified the Protocol, certain 
violations of the same could be “desirable from an economic 
standpoint.” According to some scholars, “the concept of ‘efficient 
breach’ . . . has direct applicability to international law.”30 If the free 
rider problem cannot be solved, natural resources will remain 
unprotected and overexploited.31 Hardin reformulated this problem, 
calling it the “tragedy of the commons”: if shepherds share a common 
pasture, they may be tempted to increase their herd without limit.32 
Analogously, as the atmosphere is “a shared and open access resource 
. . . readily and freely available for unsustainable exploitation,” states 
may be tempted not to reduce their greenhouse gases emissions.33  
                                                                                                                            
Publications/documents/Public% 20goods%20for%20economic%20development_sale.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A3XR-CHTR] (archived Sept. 20, 2015).  
 26.  See id. at 1. 
 27.  See Asif Efrat, A Theory of Internationally Regulated Goods, 32 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1466, 1467 (2009). 
 28.  See Kaul, supra note 18, at 6–9. 
 29.  The Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) was adopted at the third session of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP 3) in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 
2005. Although 192 countries have ratified the protocol, the United States has not. 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 
10, 1997, U.N. Doc. CCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto 
Protocol], http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [http://perma.cc/W7WV-
BSRR] (archived Sept. 20, 2015).  
 30.  Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: 
Optimal Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance” and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
243, 243 (2011). 
 31.  See generally ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE 
JUSTICE (2010); Tyler Cowen, Public Goods, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS (Terry E. Anderson ed., 2005), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/ 
PublicGoods.html [http://perma.cc/2WMH-5Q8W] (archived Sept. 20, 2015). 
 32 . Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI., Dec. 13, 1968, at 
1244 (discussing the rational human tendency to exploit a common good).  
 33.  See Broude, supra note 17, at 116–17 (“[T]he challenge of mobilizing the 
global community to reduce GHG [Greenhouse Gases] emissions represents a classic 
tragedy of the commons . . . .”) (internal citation omitted). 
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 The prisoner’s dilemma refers to a situation in which cooperation 
would lead to a better outcome, but individual players driven by self-
interest prefer a less desirable outcome.34 In the imagined scenario, 
two prisoners are held in separate cells and so are unable to agree on 
a common line of defense.35 In the meanwhile, the prosecutors give 
the prisoners the following three options: (1) if both prisoners deny 
the charge, they will each get one year in prison; (2) if one confesses 
while the other denies, the one who collaborates will be rewarded 
with freedom, while the other will spend five years in prison; or (3) if 
both confess, each will spend three years in prison.36 Undoubtedly, if 
both prisoners cooperated and denied the charge, they would each get 
one year in prison. Lacking the ability to communicate, they also lack 
the possibility to cooperate and thus to optimize their chances.37 
Without cooperation, the risk of spending five years in prison can lead 
both prisoners to confess in the attempt to minimize the higher risk.38  
 The prisoner’s dilemma illustrates that parties to a regime may 
have an incentive to defect from the system, unless mechanisms are 
established to facilitate communication and cooperation.39 For 
instance, states may have economic incentives to defect from the 
Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change. For 
instance, Canada decided to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol as it 
was certain that it would not be able to achieve its targeted emission 
reduction.40 Authors have highlighted that common goods are often 
endangered by the same states that should keep them in custody but 
subordinate them to economic interests of private actors.41 However, 
due to mechanisms of blame and shame, a number of states have 
taken action to prevent climate change because of consequential loss 
of reputation and the desire to be perceived as a reliable partner in 
future negotiations.42 
                                                                                                                            
 34.  See Kaul, supra note 18, at 7–8. 
 35.  See id. at 7 (illustrating the prisoner’s dilemma).  
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See id. at 8 (“In a national context the solution to market failures and 
collective action problems is often to bring the state in to improve conditions for 
cooperation . . . .”). 
 40.  DANIEL BODANSKY, CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, THE 
DURBAN PLATFORM: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR A 2015 AGREEMENT 5 (Dec. 2012) 
[hereinafter THE DURBAN PLATFORM], http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/durban-
platform-issues-and-options.pdf [http://perma.cc/BK2H-9XCL] (archived Sept. 20, 
2015).  
 41.  U. MATTEI, BENI COMUNI––UN MANIFESTO viii (2011). 
 42.  According to Ohlin, states make rational decisions regarding strategy in 
light of strategies selected by other states, thus generating Nash equilibria and, 
ultimately, a stable social contract. See Jens D. Ohlin, Nash Equilibrium and 
International Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 869, 876 (2011) (“A Nash equilibrium functions 
as a kind of focal point, where participants in the game gravitate toward a particular 
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 Conceptualizing climate as a global common good is useful in 
that it emphasizes the positive spillovers and common benefits that 
derive from climate. The paradigm also provides useful theoretical 
tools to examine state and individuals’ conduct in the climate domain. 
Should the state and the international community intervene to 
protect the climate? How much should be left to the private sector, 
allocating scarce resources through the market-based mechanisms? 
Clearly answers to these questions cannot be provided by economic 
analysis only.43 Legal approaches are needed because economic 
analysis seems too narrow a perspective.44  
 On the other hand, conceptualizing climate as a global common 
good presents certain drawbacks. Conceiving climate as a public good 
seems to imply that climate change is a “public bad.” However, what 
constitutes a public good is a political question. Climate change might 
be beneficial to one social group but detrimental to another. For 
instance, in the Arctic countries, climate change has brought some 
limited benefits, including reforestation45 and growing fish stocks.46 
Moreover, the Arctic’s abundant supplies of oil, gas, and minerals are 
becoming newly accessible along with newly opened polar shipping 
routes.47 On the other hand, “small island countries, countries with 
low-lying coastal . . . areas or areas liable to floods, drought and 
desertification . . . are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change.”48 Coastal communities and indigenous peoples can 
                                                                                                                            
legal norm and choose ‘compliance’ as their strategy if and only if the other players in 
the game are also choosing compliance as their strategy.”).  
 43.  See generally id. (discussing how legal regulations can affect efficiency and 
cooperation in a Nash Equilibrium model). 
 44.  See id. at 878.  
 45.  Douglas Main, How Iceland Is Benefiting from Climate Change, 
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/iceland-only-country-
benefiting-climate-change-281540.html [http://perma.cc/XJG2-N3XZ] (archived Sept. 
20, 2015) (noting that “[m]uch of the growth in forestry is made possible by warming”). 
 46.  See Charlotte McDonald-Gibson, Climate Change Prompts European 
‘Mackerel Wars’, ALASKA DISPATCH, NEWS (July 30, 2013), http://www.adn.com/article/ 
20130730/zclimate-change-prompts-european-mackerel-wars [http://perma.cc/ZR49-
RW79] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (“For a short time at least, growing fish stocks in 
European waters can be counted among the rare positive side effects of climate change, 
especially for the Icelandic fishermen . . . .”). 
 47.  Elisabeth Rosenthal, Race Is on as Ice Melt Reveals Arctic Treasures, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/science/earth/arctic-
resources-exposed-by-warming-set-off-competition.html?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/2X2U-
43F3] (archived Sept. 20, 2015).  
 48.  The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was adopted on May 9, 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, opened for signature on 
June 20, 1992, and came into force on March 21, 1994. 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1, 31 I.L.M. 849, Preamble 
(1992) [hereinafter UNFCC], http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/a/18p2a01.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/9CLT-LWLE] (archived Sept. 20, 2015). 
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be disproportionately affected by climate change.49 Furthermore, 
climate policies may lead to the primacy of professional elites vis-à-
vis local polities, being imposed top-down on local communities and 
concealing state authoritarianism, if they are not coupled with 
human rights guarantees. For instance, reforestation policies or the 
construction of dams in alleged compliance with climate change law 
can breach the fundamental rights of indigenous peoples and other 
local communities by causing forced evictions,50 affecting cultural 
practices and biodiversity.51 
 In conclusion, the conceptualization of climate as a global 
common good may be useful in that it highlights certain specificities 
of climate. Namely, it provides collective benefits and has a global 
character. However, this paradigm is neither the only paradigm nor 
the definitive one; rather, it needs to be complemented by additional 
conceptual paradigms.  
III. CLIMATE CHANGE AS A COMMON CONCERN OF HUMANKIND 
 With the potential to radically transform the natural 
environment, “[c]limate change is one of the major challenges of our 
time . . . .”52 Climate change, meant as shifting weather patterns, has 
been a constant feature through the millennia.53 Yet, since the 1950s, 
                                                                                                                            
 49.  See Jay Williams, The Impact of Climate Change on Indigenous Peoples—
The Implications for the Cultural, Spiritual, Economic and Legal Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 14 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 648 (2012). 
 50.  See Mariya Gromilova, Revisiting Planned Relocation as a Climate Change 
Adaptation Strategy: The Added Value of a Human Rights-Based Approach, 10 
UTRECHT L. REV. 76, 80–94 (2014) (discussing the impact of relocations and evictions 
on the rights of indigenous people to self-determination, development, adequate 
housing, and education). 
 51.  See Margaux J. Hall & David C. Weiss, Avoiding Adaptation Apartheid: 
Climate Change Adaptation & Human Rights Law, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 309, 309 (2012) 
(noting the obligation of states to ensure the cultural and social rights of indigenous 
people when implementing environment-friendly laws); Ole W. Pedersen, The Janus-
Head of Human Rights and Climate Change: Adaptation and Mitigation, 80 NORDIC J. 
INT’L LAW 403, 408–09 (2011) (“[S]tates will have to take human rights provision[s] into 
consideration when they seek to implement specific solutions in the name of climate 
change.”). 
 52.  U.N. Environmental Programme (UNEP), Climate Change Factsheet: An 
Overview, http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_Profile/Climate_change.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
H6RY-MFAR] (archived Sept. 20, 2015). 
 53.  See, e.g., NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA) 
WEATHER SERVICE, Climate Change 1 (2007), http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/brochures/ 
climate/Climatechange.pdf [http://perma.cc/SW9N-WGFF] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) 
(“The geologic record includes significant evidence for large-scale climate changes in 
Earth’s past.”). 
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its growth has proceeded at an unmatched speed and level,54 partly 
due to human activities, and mainly greenhouse gas emissions. 
Climate change has affected ecosystems,55 warming the atmosphere 
and ocean, reducing the amounts of snow and ice, and raising the sea 
level.  
 International law instruments regard climate change as a 
“common concern” of humankind.56 While common concerns indicate 
community interests,57 common concerns of humankind constitute 
interests of the international community as a whole.58 As common 
concerns of humanity can affect populations regardless of state 
boundaries, they require a delicate balance between state sovereignty 
and accountability to the international community.59 With regard to 
such common concerns, states are not entirely free to adopt whatever 
policy may suit their needs; rather, common concerns require 
international cooperation. In fact, after affirming that climate change 
and its adverse effects “are a common concern of humankind,”60 the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)61 acknowledges that “the global nature of climate change 
calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their 
participation in an effective and appropriate international 
                                                                                                                            
 54.  See id. (“The last decade of the 20th Century and the beginning of the 21st 
have been the warmest period in the entire global instrumental temperature record, 
starting in the mid-19th century.”). 
 55.  See Gian-Reto Walther et al., Ecological Responses to Recent Climate 
Change, 416 NATURE 389, 389 (2002) (noting that climate change has spurred 
“ecological change[s] across systems”). 
 56.  See G.A. Res. 43/53, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53 (Dec. 6, 1988) (“[C]limate 
change is a common concern of mankind, since climate is an essential condition which 
sustains life on earth.”); Frank Biermann, “Common Concern of Humankind”: The 
Emergence of a New Concept of International Environmental Law, 34 ARCHIV DES 
VÖLKERRECHTS 426, 426 (1996) (noting that climate change and other environmental 
issues such as biological diversity have been regarded as a “common concern of 
mankind.”). See generally Jutta Brunneé, Common Areas, Common Heritage, and 
Common Concerns, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 550–73 (2007) (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007) (“The concept of common 
concern of humankind . . . relates to global environmental problems, like climate 
change or the conversation of biological diversity, that can only be resolved if states 
collaborate.”). 
 57.  See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius 
and Suárez, 85 A.J.I.L. 110, 113–14 (1991). 
 58.  See generally Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interests in 
International Law, 250 RECUEIL DES COURS 217 (1994).  
 59.  See PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 130 
(3d ed. 2009) (“[I]nsofar as states continue to enjoy sovereignty over their own natural 
resources and the freedom to determine how they will be used, this sovereignty is not 
unlimited or absolute, but must now be exercised within the confines of . . . global 
responsibilities . . . .”). 
 60.  UNFCC, supra note 48, preamble.  
 61.  Id. 
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response.”62 Other international instruments call for the protection of 
global climate for present and future generations of mankind.63 
Therefore, as a common concern, climate change is to be governed as 
a sort of common good and requires international cooperation.64 
 While the analytical concept of common concern does not express 
a general principle of law, it is not an empty political manifesto.65 
Rather, it has legal content, serving as “a catalyst for the 
development of binding rules on diligent conduct of States” and 
“prepar[ing] the ground . . . for liability.”66 Accordingly, “it is . . . one 
of the most important aspects of the progressive development of 
international environmental law and the restriction of national 
sovereignty for the benefit of the community of States.”67  
 The notion of common concern presents some commonalities with 
the concept of “common heritage” of mankind. The concept of common 
heritage indicates resources belonging to humanity as a whole. Both 
concepts of common heritage and common concern are of a legal 
character as they are expressly mentioned in a number of 
international law instruments. Both concepts refer to humanity as a 
whole, rather than referring to states.68 Both concepts echo the idea 
of common interest. They “inevitably transcend the boundaries of a 
single state and require collective action in response . . . .”69 In fact, 
both common heritage and common concerns cannot be managed 
efficiently and effectively by a given state; rather, they require 
collective action.70  
 Yet, the concepts of common heritage and common concern 
diverge, having different application, function, and objectives. The 
concept of common heritage applies to resources in common spaces, 
                                                                                                                            
 62.  Id. preamble. 
 63.  See generally G.A. Res. 44/228, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/28 (Dec. 22, 1989); 
G.A. Res. 43/53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53 (Dec. 6, 1988); G.A. Res. 44/207, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/44/207 (Dec. 22, 1989); G.A. Res. 45/212, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/212 (Dec. 21, 
1990); G.A. Res. 46/169, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/169 (Dec. 19, 1991) (all supporting the 
protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind). 
 64.  See Thomas Cottier, The Emerging Principle of Common Concern: A Brief 
Outline 8 (NCCR Trade Regulation, Working Paper 2012/20, 2012) (highlighting that 
“[t]he concept of Common Concern was introduced to foster international cooperation 
and shared responsibility in combating global warming and addressing the challenges 
of climate change.”).  
 65.  See Nele Matz, The Common Interest in International Law: Some 
Reflections on Its Normative Content, 62 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES 
ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT – HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 17, 19 (2002) 
(noting that “[t]he common interest, although not or not yet being a clear enough 
principle of law, is already more than an empty political phrase.”). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  See Dinah Shelton, Common Concern of Humanity, 1 IUSTUM AEQUUM 
SALUTARE 33, 33 (2009). 
 69.  Id. at 34. 
 70.  See id. 
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notably the deep seabed and the moon.71 The concept of common 
heritage has also been used in some international cultural law 
instruments to indicate a general interest of the international 
community in the conservation and enjoyment of cultural resources.72 
In the cultural sector, such concept would be akin to the concept of 
common concern of humankind, developed in relation to 
environmental goods.73 By contrast, common concerns do not belong 
to a specific area; rather, they “can occur within or outside sovereign 
territory.”74 While climate change is a paradigmatic example of a 
common concern of humankind, other examples include the 
conservation of biological diversity75 and the prevention of 
desertification and drought.76 
 The common heritage concept has played a revolutionary role in 
the making of international law. The areas that are designated as 
common heritage cannot be appropriated and/or be subject to claims 
of sovereignty. Rather, they are res publica (commons) governed by 
an international authority, and the benefits derived from the 
exploitation of the common heritage are to be shared equitably and 
for the benefit of mankind.77 The notion of common heritage 
challenged the “structural relationship between rich and poor 
countries” and amounted to a “revolution not merely in the law of the 
sea, but also in international relations.”78  
                                                                                                                            
 71.  See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 136 (Dec. 10, 1982) 
(recognizing that “[t]he Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind”). 
See generally Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11 (Dec. 5, 1979) (proclaiming that “[t]he Moon 
and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind . . . .”). 
 72.  See VALENTINA VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW AND ARBITRATION 22–23 (2014). 
 73.  See Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions, Records of the General Conference, UNESCO at 83, (Oct. 20, 
2005) (recognizing that “cultural diversity forms a common heritage of mankind”); 
Francesco Francioni, Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as 
a Shared Interest of Humanity, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1209 (2004). 
 74.  Shelton, supra note 68, at 35 (noting that “[c]ommon concerns . . . are not 
spatial”). 
 75.  Convention on Biological Diversity, pmbl., June 6, 1992, 1760 UNTS 79. 
 76.  Shelton, supra note 68, at 37; Convention to Combat Desertification in 
Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in 
Africa, June 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1328. 
 77.  See KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW xxi (1998) (examining the notion of common heritage of 
humanity); Graham Nicholson, The Common Heritage of Mankind and Mining: An 
Analysis of the Law as to the High Seas, Outer Space, the Antarctic and World Heritage, 
6 N.Z. J. ENVTL. L. 177, 178 (2002) (scrutinizing how the law governs the exploitation of 
natural resources within areas defined as “common heritage” of humanity). 
 78.  A. Pardo, Ocean, Space and Mankind, 6 THIRD WORLD Q. 559 (1984) 
(highlighting the revolutionary nature of the notion of common heritage). 
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 By contrast, the common concern concept is not a radical notion, 
but it is a suitable analytical tool expressing current challenges in 
international environmental law. Common concerns indicate that 
specific issues are “no longer in the reserved domain and under the 
exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states.”79 A common concern 
requires “management of environmental resources at all levels of 
governance,” including “participation by non-state actors.”80 When 
action is taken in matters of common concern, a double balance must 
be struck between competing objectives: (1) national and 
international, and (2) climate change mitigation and other legitimate 
policy objectives. On the one hand, the action of the international 
community “must be balanced with respect for national 
sovereignty.”81 On the other, a balance must be struck between the 
objectives pursued by climate change law and those pursued by other 
domains of international law such as international economic law. In 
fact, these other fields are regarded as “instrumental to achieving 
[other] common interest[s] of humanity.”82 In conclusion, while 
common concern is “a far from a precise term,”83 it may “facilitate 
levelling the playing field” between different conflicting interests 
before different dispute settlement mechanisms.84  
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 
 Human rights have played a marginal role in international 
climate change law and politics to date.85 However, this has started to 
change, and a growing number of scholars and practitioners have 
investigated the linkage between climate change and a range of 
human rights.86 Several international instruments have also 
                                                                                                                            
 79.  Shelton, supra note 68, at 40. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 38. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Tullio Treves, Introduction, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND COMMON CONCERNS 1, 3 (Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2014) (adding that the concept of 
common concern “permits various and sometimes surprising interpretations”). 
 84.  Id. at 6 (referring to international investment law and arbitration). 
 85.  Derek Bell, Climate Change and Human Rights, CLIMATE CHANGE 4(3) 
159–70, 159 (2013) (noting that “[h]uman rights have not played a significant role in 
the international law and politics of climate change to date.”).  
 86.  Id. (highlighting that “there has been increasing interest among legal 
scholars and moral and political philosophers in a human rights approach to climate 
change.”). See generally STEPHEN HUMPHREYS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
(2010); Daniel Bodansky, Introduction: Climate Change and Human Rights: Unpacking 
the Issues, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 511 (2010); John H. Knox, Linking Human Rights 
and Climate Change at the United Nations, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477 (2009); 
Lavanya Rajamani, The Increasing Currency and Relevance of Rights-Based 
Perspectives in International Negotiations on Climate Change, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 391 
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acknowledged such a link.87 A number of key questions arise with 
regard to the interplay between climate change and human rights. Is 
there a human right to a stable climate? Does climate change affect 
human rights? How do climate change policies interact with human 
rights? What are the limits, if any, to climate change policies? Who 
should bear the burden of climate policies?  
 There are no firm answers to these questions. First, whether 
there is a human right to a stable climate is uncertain. An additional 
question is whether entitlements to a stable climate constitute an 
element of other human rights. Certain climate change issues have 
been framed in terms of human rights.88 For instance, entitlements to 
a stable climate could be considered to be a component of the right to 
a healthy environment, which is a third-generation human right.89 
Third-generation human rights include solidarity rights, namely 
those rights that respond to challenges that are not addressed by civil 
and political rights on one hand, and economic, social, and cultural 
rights on the other—which can be termed first- and second-
generation rights respectively.90 While the scope of third-generation 
rights remain debated, they are deemed to include the right to 
development, the right to self-determination, the right to a healthy 
environment,91 and other collective rights—rights held by a group 
qua group rather than by its members severally. A number of 
international instruments have recognized the right to a healthy 
                                                                                                                            
(2010); John Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human 
Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law, 25 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283 (2000); Marc Limon, Human Rights Obligations and 
Accountability in the Face of Climate Change, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 50 (2010).  
 87.  Human Rights Council Res. 7/23 (Mar. 28, 2008); Human Rights Council 
Res. 10/4, U.N Doc. A/HRC/RES/10/4 (Mar. 25, 2009) (focusing specifically on human 
rights and climate change). 
 88.  See James W. Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: 
Philosophical Perspectives on Its Scope and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 281 
(1993). 
 89.  On the right to a healthy environment, see generally Sumudu Atapattu, 
The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted? The Emergence of a Human 
Right to a Healthy Environment Under International Law, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 65 
(2002); Jennifer A. Downs, A Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment: An 
Argument for a Third Generation Right, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 351 (1993); Melissa 
Fung, The Right to a Healthy Environment: Core Obligations Under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 14 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. 
RESOL. 97 (2006); Iveta Hodkova, Is There a Right to a Healthy Environment in the 
International Legal Order?, 7 CONN. J. INT’L L. 65 (1991); James T. McClymonds, The 
Human Right to a Healthy Environment: An International Legal Perspective, 37 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 583 (1992); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Health and Environmental 
Protection: Linkages in Law and Practice, 1 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 9 
(2007).  
 90.  See Philip Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive 
Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?, 29 NETH. INT’L L. 
REV. 307, 307–22 (1982). 
 91.  See Ben Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights: Human Duties, 
Obligations, and Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 565, 599 (2001). 
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environment.92 In addition, several domestic courts have guaranteed 
the right to a healthy environment in various countries.93  
 Second, with regard to the question as to whether climate change 
can affect human rights, some scholars have pinpointed that climate 
change can affect a broad range of human rights including the rights 
to life, health, food, water, property, self-determination, and 
subsistence.94 Not only does climate change affect human rights in a 
direct fashion, exacerbating natural disasters, such as heat waves, 
floods, and droughts, but also it affects human rights in an indirect 
and cumulative way.95 The indirect effects of climate change are 
evident in a number of sectors such as agriculture, food security, and 
water resources.96 The very existence of some states may be 
jeopardized by climate change, spurring the migration of “climate 
refugees.”97 There have been attempts to frame climate change as a 
violation of human rights before different fora.98  
                                                                                                                            
 92.  See, e.g, U.N Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm 
Declaration, ¶ 1 (June 16, 1972) (“Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality 
and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of 
dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the 
environment for present and future generations.”). 
 93.  Minors Oposa v. Sec’y. of the Dep’t of Env’t. & Nat. Res., 33 I.L.M. 173 
(S.C., July 30, 1993) (Phil.). For commentary, see BRIGIT C.A. TOEBES, THE RIGHT TO 
HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999). 
 94.  G.A. Res. 18/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/18/22 at 2 (Oct. 17, 2011) (listing 
“the right to life, the right to adequate food, the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health, the right to adequate housing, the right to self-determination, and 
the right to safe drinking water and sanitation.”); Simon Caney, Climate Change, 
Human Rights and Moral Thresholds, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 69–90 
(Stephen Humphreys ed., 2010). 
 95.  Navi Pillay, Opening Remarks at the Human Rights Council Seminar, The 
Adverse Impacts of Climate Change on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights (Feb. 23, 
2012) (“Slowly and incrementally, land will become too dry to till, crops will die, rising 
sea levels will flood coastal dwellings and spoil freshwater, species will disappear, and 
livelihoods will vanish.”). 
 96.  See id. 
 97.  See generally Laura Westra, Environmental Justice and the Rights of 
Ecological Refugees (2009) (noting that climate change is increasingly leading to the 
displacement of populations from their homelands, and that there is currently no 
protection in international law for people made refugees by such means). 
 98.  Owen Cordes-Holland, The Sinking of the Strait: The Implications of 
Climate Change for Torres Strait Islanders’ Human Rights Protected by the ICCPR, 9 
MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 405, 414 (2008) (examining the impact of climate change on the 
human rights of Torres Strait Islanders); see also Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Petition to the 
Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting 
from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States, at 116, 
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ICC_Petition_7Dec05.pdf [http://perma.cc/VT4R-
9NC4] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (discussing the petition brought by Inuit to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, requesting the United States to take into 
account the impact of GHG emissions on the Arctic Environment, and thus on their 
human rights including the right to food, health, culture, property and self-
determination).  
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 Third, climate change policies interact with human rights in 
multifold ways. On the one hand, greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
mitigation policies can prevent some of the most devastating effects of 
climate change. On the other hand, they can affect a range of human 
rights, including non-discrimination, due process, property rights, 
and others.99 For instance, subsidies for farmers to switch from 
agriculture to biofuel production may affect food security, especially 
in developing countries.100 Reforestation projects can breach the 
fundamental rights of indigenous peoples by causing forced 
evictions.101 In this respect, states should take human rights into 
consideration when developing their climate change policies.102  
 Fourth, certain human rights, especially access to information 
and participation in decision-making processes can be regarded as 
essential to good climate governance. 
 Finally, climate justice (i.e. viewing climate change from an 
ethical perspective and considering how its causes and effects relate 
to concepts of justice) is central to human rights discourse. The issue 
of climate justice is twofold. On the one hand, at the international 
level, it seems that those states least responsible for climate change 
experience its greatest impacts. As the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights pointed out, “Many of the least developed countries 
and small island States, which have contributed least to global 
greenhouse gas emissions, will be worst affected by global 
warming.”103 On the other hand, at the national level, “[t]he effects of 
climate change will be most acutely felt by those segments of the 
population whose rights protections are already precarious due to 
factors such as poverty, gender, age, minority status, migrant status 
and disability.”104 Therefore, under human rights law, “[s]tates are 
                                                                                                                            
 99.  See Alyssa Johl & Sébastien Duyck, Promoting Human Rights in the 
Future Climate Change Policy, 15 ETHICS POL’Y & ENV’T 298 (2012). 
 100.  Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and Climate Change 27 (Buffett Ctr, for 
Int’l and Comparative Law Studies, North Western Univ., Working Paper No. 009/2, 
2009). 
 101.  Pedersen, supra note 51, at 408–09. 
 102.  Human Rights Council Res. 16/11, Human Rights and the Environment, 
U.N. Doc A/HRC/RES/16/11 (April 12, 2011) (urging states to take human rights into 
consideration when developing their environmental policies). 
 103.  Pillay, supra note 95 (noting “the striking ‘climate injustice’ that many of 
the least developed countries and small island States, which have contributed least to 
global greenhouse gas emissions, will be worst affected by global warming.”); see also 
Human Rights Council Res. 7/23 (Mar. 28, 2008) (“[L]ow-lying and other small island 
countries, countries with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to 
floods, drought and desertification, and developing countries with fragile mountainous 
ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.”). 
 104.  Pillay, supra note 95 (noting additionally that “[c]ertain groups, such as 
women, children, indigenous peoples and rural communities, are more exposed to 
climate change effects and risks.”). 
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legally bound to address such vulnerability in accordance with the 
human rights principle of equality and non-discrimination.”105 
 More substantively, if one scrutinizes the interplay between 
climate change and human rights through the tripartite structure of 
the latter—according to which human rights provisions compel states 
to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights—in relation to climate 
change, this means that states are required to adopt measures to 
prevent greenhouse gas emissions, to adopt mitigation measures, 
inter alia regulating private corporations, and to provide remedies 
when breaches have occurred.106 As the UN Independent Expert on 
human rights and the environment John Knox pointed out, “The 
obligation to protect human rights from environmental harm does not 
require States to prohibit all activities that may cause any 
environmental degradation.”107 Rather, “[s]tates have discretion to 
strike a balance between environmental protection and other issues 
of societal importance, such as economic development and the rights 
of others.”108 Yet, “the balance cannot be unreasonable, or result in 
unjustified, foreseeable infringements of human rights.”109 
V. CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE 
 After having examined the various conceptualizations of climate 
change, the Article now examines how climate change is governed. 
Climate change governance has emerged as a new frontier of study 
and has come to the forefront of legal debate.110 Climate change 
governance is a “regime complex”111—a range of multilevel, 
                                                                                                                            
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Siobhán McIrneney-Lankford, Climate Change and Human Rights: An 
Introduction to Legal Issues, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 431, 433, 436–37 (2009); see also 
John Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477 (2009); 
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Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom, No. 360022/97, 8 July 2003, ¶ 98, and African 
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2011 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 25, 25. 
 111.  Keohane & Victor, supra note 5, at 10–33.  
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“multiscalar”112 and multipolar regulatory frameworks113 at times 
diverging and at times converging, if not overlapping. Climate change 
governance constitutes a good example of multilevel and multiscalar 
legal pluralism as multiple bodies govern climate change at national, 
regional, and international levels. Climate change governance is a 
multipolar regulatory framework as multiple actors play an 
important role with regard to climate change, ranging from 
international administrative bodies to private actors, and from 
national courts and tribunals to international economic fora.  
 Why are certain areas of international law, such as climate 
change law, characterized by an inherent fragmentation or a 
dispersed legal landscape, while other sectors are characterized by 
binding, concentrated, and robust regulatory frameworks? Political 
scientists suggest that “[w]here conflicts of interest are not severe 
and especially where power is concentrated, incentives to cooperate 
can lead to the construction of robust international regimes, such as 
the international trade regime . . . . But where interests and power 
are more fragmented, incentives for cooperation often lead to . . . 
‘regime complexes.’”114 Climate change law is an area characterized 
by intense conflicts of interests between industrialized countries and 
developing countries on the one hand, and between public and private 
actors. On the one hand, developing countries focus on their 
developmental needs and argue that, historically, the bulk of 
greenhouse gas emissions have been produced by industrialized 
countries. In turn, while some industrialized countries are concerned 
that climate change regulatory measures could make their industries 
less competitive, others consider renewable energies as an 
opportunity to achieve energy security and a better and healthier 
environment. On the other hand, private actors can and have 
contested regulatory measures affecting their economic interests.  
 Therefore, three dualisms traditionally characterize climate 
change law: (1) the distinction between the mandatory and the 
voluntary, (2) the distinction between public law and private law, and 
(3) the division between domestic and international law.115 However, 
                                                                                                                            
 112.  Osofsky, supra note 23, at 587 (describing climate change as a 
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these traditional boundaries have become blurry in contemporary 
climate law, as both private and public traits, national and 
international dimensions, as well as mandatory and voluntary 
features constantly interact in several different ways. Climate change 
law has been increasingly regulated at the national and international 
levels by both public and private actors. Moreover, climate change 
law is characterized by a peculiar mixture of mandatory and 
voluntary approaches. The next sections will scrutinize these 
dichotomies and their interactions. 
A. Mandatory and Voluntary Approaches 
 There is a sort of mimesis and dialectic between the mandatory 
and voluntary as well as the hard law and soft law dimensions of 
climate law. Binding international legal instruments include treaties, 
protocols, and amendments, as well as “secondary legislation,” i.e. 
decisions taken pursuant to a treaty if the treaty authorizes the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to adopt rules on a specific matter.116 
Such instruments are subject to the rule of pacta sunt servanda, and 
if they are violated, they give rise to international responsibility.117 In 
parallel, several subsidiary treaty-based bodies have produced 
influential “soft law” (i.e. instruments that do not have any legally 
binding force but can be morally persuasive). 
 Among the mandatory instruments of climate law, the 1992 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)118 has played a leading role in the making of climate law. 
The UNFCCC aims at “control[ling] greenhouse gas emission,”119 
while enabling “economic development . . . in a sustainable 
manner.”120 Under the UNFCCC, member states agreed upon a 
common but very general approach to the problems associated with 
global climate change. By establishing a system of governance for an 
issue area, framework conventions facilitate the development of 
cognitive and normative consensus about the relevant facts and the 
appropriate international response. Like other framework 
conventions, the UNFCCC sets out an incremental process in 
lawmaking. It establishes a discourse on climate change, setting 
                                                                                                                            
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 97–116 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) 
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 116.  THE DURBAN PLATFORM, supra note 40, at 3. 
 117.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.”). 
 118.  UNFCC, supra note 48. 
 119.  Id. preamble. 
 120.  Id. art. 2. 
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general objectives and instituting a structure for further course of 
action. Subsequent treaties, the Protocols, then develop more specific 
commitments that supplement the original convention and require 
states to undertake specific legal obligations.121  
 Specific commitments on the reduction of greenhouse gases were 
negotiated later and led to the inception of the Kyoto Protocol.122 The 
Kyoto Protocol legally binds parties to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions. Under the concept of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities,” the Protocol places heavier commitments on 
developed nations.123 Ongoing UN negotiations are developing a new 
international climate change agreement—the Paris Protocol—that 
will be adopted at the Paris climate conference in December 2015 and 
implemented in 2020, after the Kyoto Protocol ends.124  
 The decisions of the Conference of the Parties, the supreme 
decision-making organ of the Convention, have further extended the 
scope of climate law providing additional supporting rules.125 The 
legal status of COP decisions falls between the two extremes of 
voluntary and mandatory. While some of these decisions have been 
perceived as nonmandatory, others have been perceived as having a 
mandatory nature.  
 The UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and some COP decisions 
constitute a top-down, mandatory approach to climate change 
governance. They have raised awareness of the importance of climate 
change mitigation and spurred the development of domestic climate 
policies. All of these instruments channel climate concerns into the 
fabric of international law and influence policymaking and 
adjudication, due to the almost global ratification of the UNFCCC.  
                                                                                                                            
 121.  See John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of 
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 In parallel, a bottom-up, facilitative approach favoring voluntary 
actions has emerged.126 For instance, a voluntary framework was 
adopted in Cancun.127 The Cancun Agreements took stock of the 
action undertaken by both developing and developed countries 
respectively,128 “established a new funding mechanism (the Green 
Climate Fund), and incorporated an agreement on reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+).”129 Several 
subsidiary treaty-based bodies have produced influential soft law.130 
Soft law is a contested concept. Some scholars have pointed out the 
contradictory nature of the expression,131 as commitments are either 
legal or non-legal.132 Yet, others highlight the existence and even the 
desirability of gray areas and different degrees of normativity. In fact, 
while binding instruments are more difficult to achieve in areas—
such as climate change—where multiple interests converge and 
diverge, soft law instruments, non-binding instruments, and 
instruments with a mixture of both legal and nonlegal approaches 
can catalyze consensus and have a greater influence on state behavior 
than their legally binding counterparts. The principle of state 
sovereignty, which underlies binding treaty commitments, often 
prevents the adoption of binding instruments to govern climate 
change. This does not mean, however, that nonbinding instruments 
have no effect whatsoever.133  
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 Soft law instruments present a quasi-legal nature and influence 
both treaty making and treaty interpretation. On the one hand, soft 
law can morph into hard law in two different ways. First, 
declarations, recommendations, and other nonbinding instruments 
can constitute the first step towards a treaty-making process, in 
which reference will be made to the principles already stated in the 
soft law instruments. Second, they can influence the practice of states 
and eventually lead to the coalescence of customary law. On the other 
hand, international courts and tribunals do take soft law instruments 
into account. For instance, in the Texaco arbitration, the sole 
arbitrator applied the General Assembly’s Declaration on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources.134 
 While top-down, mandatory approaches address the collective 
action problem encompassed by climate change and solve the free 
rider problem, bottom-up, voluntary approaches foster local action.135 
Current negotiations for a new climate deal that will come into effect 
and be implemented starting in 2020 propose the increased adoption 
of “hybrid architectural approaches,”136 mixing mandatory top-down 
and voluntary bottom-up approaches to climate change mitigation.137 
While the negotiations aim at “developing a new protocol, another 
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force,”138 they also 
consider voluntary approaches to improve states’ environmental 
performance beyond legal requirements.139 Voluntary approaches 
may be more cost-effective than “command and control” 
mechanisms.140 Yet, as only moderate results have been achieved 
through voluntary approaches, the adoption of a well-articulated mix 
of regulatory and voluntary instruments is preferable. 
B. Public and Private Dimensions of Climate Change Law 
 There is a sort of mimesis and dialectic between the private and 
public dimensions of climate change law. On the one hand, there is an 
increasing awareness that climate change requires public 
intervention due to the existence of undeniable public interests. On 
the other hand, the role of private actors remains crucial. While 
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human activities have substantially contributed to climate change,141 
they can contribute to its mitigation.  
 Private actors can contribute to climate change mitigation in 
different ways. Not only can they fund climate change mitigation 
actions, but they play a role in the development of climate change law 
and its implementation. According to the United Nations, “nearly 90 
per cent of the funds needed to address global warming will derive 
from the private sector.”142 Moreover, private actors have played a 
significant role both in the normative development of the field and in 
its implementation.143 At the normative level, given the complexity of 
climate change and the limitations of “command and control” 
regulatory techniques to govern it, “regulatory tools that use market 
principles to achieve environmental goals” have been used.144  
 For instance, the Kyoto Protocol calls for the involvement of 
private entities, such as foreign investors, to pursue its objective of 
limiting and reducing greenhouse emissions. Private actors can play 
an important role in helping states limit their emissions under two of 
the Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms.145 Under the joint implementation 
mechanism, industrialized countries can authorize legal entities, such 
as private investors, to participate in green investments in other 
industrialized countries to meet the home country’s Kyoto targets. 
Under the clean development mechanism (CDM), industrialized 
countries or their investors can participate in projects in developing 
countries, thus contributing to the home country’s Kyoto targets. 
Industrialized countries obtain certified emissions credits (CERs) 
that can be used to meet their targets or sold on the carbon market, 
and developing countries receive low carbon technology and financial 
flows that contribute to their sustainable growth. Foreign 
investments can thus represent an effective tool to mitigate climate 
change. Having know-how in energy-saving technology to reduce 
carbon emissions,146 foreign investors can and do transfer technology 
and invest in renewable energy projects. 
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C. Global and Local Dimensions of Climate Governance 
 In parallel, there is a sort of dialectic between the global and 
local dimensions of climate governance. Local, bottom-up approaches 
to climate governance are important because the change of individual 
and local behaviors can contribute to fighting climate change. 
However, local governance may emphasize local needs including 
those of economic growth, which, in certain cases, may sensibly 
diverge from international desiderata. In fact, local dimensions of 
climate governance can suffer from “myopia and parochialism,” 
prioritizing economic interests over climate concerns and eventually 
leading to “the tragedy of the commons.”147  
 By contrast, international cooperation and collective action are 
essential to govern a global public good such as climate. Global 
governance of the commons can prevent the risks of a regulatory 
“race to the bottom”148—that is state deregulation of key sectors to 
attract or retain economic activities in its jurisdiction. However, 
global governance favors experts over nonexperts. Under global 
governance, decision-making processes tend to be elitist and opaque. 
Such top-down approaches may not necessarily be responsive to local 
needs. Human rights bodies have advocated the need to humanize 
and democratize climate law and condemned the forced eviction of 
local communities for the construction of large dams or other energy-
related infrastructures. 
 The global dimension of climate change governance is 
multipolar. While the UNFCCC constitutes a central regime 
governing climate change, it would be a mistake to conceive of it as 
the only global legal framework governing the climate. In fact, other 
regimes can be relevant, including other environmental regimes, 
international trade law, international cultural law, and international 
investment law.149 For instance, the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer,150 which aims to protect the ozone 
layer by phasing out the production of numerous substances that are 
responsible for ozone depletion, contributed to the mitigation of 
climate change by cutting some industrial gases that cause the 
depletion of the ozone layer and also contribute to climate change.151 
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Analogously, while conflicts between international trade law and 
climate measures can arise,152 different provisions of international 
trade law “could be used for climate change mitigation.”153 Similarly, 
given the duty of the states parties to the World Heritage Convention 
(WHC)154 to protect world heritage within their territories,155 the 
World Heritage Committee has imposed site-specific mitigation 
obligations on them.156 In parallel, the World Bank has organized a 
large fund to invest in reforestation projects and a fund to help 
countries adapt to the effects of climate change.157 More importantly, 
the Bank has brought climate change concerns into its main lending 
activities.  
 Questions remain in those cases in which the two interests—
internationalist and nationalist—diverge. Which interest should 
prevail in the regulation of climate: the interest of the locals or the 
interests of the international community? Often the two interests 
coincide. Both communities have an interest in the mitigation of 
climate change. However, when interests collide, states face the 
dilemma as to whether to comply with international law or to agree 
with the preferences of the local constituencies. Of further interest is 
the question of how this overlapping or collision of interests relates to 
the admission and operation of foreign investments. Is there any 
difference between using the local public interest or the global 
interest as a parameter in the interpretation of international 
(investment) law and the adjudication of the relevant disputes? 
D. Conclusion 
 In climate change governance, the distinctions between 
mandatory and voluntary, between public and private, and between 
global and local are best understood as the ends of three continuums. 
The distinction between mandatory and voluntary approaches is far 
from being a neat one; for instance, there are COP decisions that fall 
in between the two extremes. The dichotomy between public and 
private dimensions of climate law spans over different degrees “with 
regard to both the tools of regulation and the identity of the 
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regulators.”158 Finally, the question as to how power should be 
allocated between national and international levels of climate 
governance is far from being settled. 
 Not only are these differentiations fluid and intertwined, but 
they also are also dynamic.159 Soft law can harden and morph into 
hard law while “hard law can be softened if left largely 
unenforced.”160 What is now part of public law may become part of 
private law after privatization processes, while some aspects of 
private law can become “public” because of political contingencies. 
Moreover, public law looks to private law in order to learn from its 
arguments, dispute settlement mechanisms, and so on. Finally, like 
other sectors of environmental regulation, climate governance has 
traditionally fallen within the regulatory autonomy of the state. 
However, this has started to change since the inception of the 
UNFCCC. Certainly, “the global scope of climate change” requires 
“collective action” at the international level.161 
VI. CLIMATE CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW  
 As the international economic order has become more and more 
intertwined with concerns for climate change,162 the international 
investment regime can and has played a role in global climate 
governance. Corporations can play a dual role with regard to climate 
change. On the one hand, corporations are the main greenhouse gas 
producers,163 and greenhouse gases emissions spur climate change. 
On the other hand, multinational corporations can play an important 
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role in greening the economy.164 For instance, investments in 
renewable energy projects—those projects that derive energy from 
resources that are naturally replenished such as sunlight, wind, rain, 
tides, waves, and geothermal heat—can foster climate change 
mitigation and sustainable development.165  
 As mentioned, there is no comprehensive multilateral framework 
governing foreign direct investments. Rather, more than 3,000 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) regulate this vital area of 
international law.166 This does not mean, however, that the system is 
fragmented; rather, authors have suggested that a de facto 
multilateralization of the system has taken place167 due to the fact 
that many BITs share common and/or similar provisions, and arbitral 
tribunals do refer to earlier awards, despite the absence of stare 
decisis in international (investment) law.168 The Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT)169 is a multilateral treaty governing energy investment 
and trade. Both bilateral investment treaties and the ECT provide a 
number of substantive standards of protection, including fair and 
equitable treatment, the prohibition of unlawful expropriation, full 
protection and security, non-discrimination, among others.  
 At the procedural level, both bilateral investment treaties and 
the ECT allow investors to file arbitration claims directly against host 
states for violations of their protections under the relevant provisions. 
Investor–state arbitrations can be ad hoc or institutionalized. In the 
latter case, the arbitrator can refer the dispute to a variety of fora, 
including the International Center for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. These 
institutions do not themselves decide disputes; rather, they 
administer the disputes in accordance with the applicable rules.  
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 Do investment treaties chill and/or impede endeavors to mitigate 
the effects of climate change?170 Investment treaties can foster 
investments in renewable energy, thus contributing to climate change 
mitigation. Yet, concerns remain that investment treaty protections 
can prevent regulation designed to mitigate climate change171 and/or 
that investment treaty arbitrations can affect the implementation of 
climate law. Foreign companies can (and have) file(d) investor–state 
arbitrations, contending that climate change-related regulatory 
measures breach the relevant investment treaty provisions.172 
Climate change-related regulatory measures can affect the economic 
interests of private actors by requiring technological upgrades or 
banning specific economic activities.173 Where the economic activities 
affected are owned by foreign investors, such measures can (and 
have) give(n) rise to investor–state arbitrations under the relevant 
treaties.174 Foreign investors can (and have) argue(d) that these 
measures violate the prohibition on unlawful expropriation or the fair 
and equitable treatment standard, among others.175 The next Part 
will explore how arbitral tribunals have dealt with climate change-
related measures and whether such tribunals are contributing to 
climate change governance. 
VII. BEYOND KNOWN WORLDS: CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE BY 
ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS? 
 Investment treaty arbitration has become the last frontier of 
climate change-related disputes. Until recently, foreign investors had 
not challenged climate change-related measures before arbitral 
tribunals.176 Today, a number of investment treaty arbitrations 
concern regulatory measures relating to climate change. This is not to 
say that investment treaty tribunals are the best venues for this type 
                                                                                                                            
 170.  See, e.g., Schill, supra note 14, at 469–77 (assessing “the interaction 
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of dispute, let alone the only venue.177 Rather, given the importance 
of such disputes for climate change governance, and the fact that 
there is scarce, if any, literature examining this emerging 
jurisprudence, this Part aims to cover this gap, moving beyond the 
state of the art, mapping and examining the relevant arbitrations and 
considering investment arbitration as a tool of climate governance. 
 The UNFCCC does not establish a dedicated dispute settlement 
mechanism for climate change-related disputes. Rather, like other 
multilateral environmental agreements, it restates the need for 
parties to settle their dispute “through negotiation or any other 
peaceful means of their own choice.”178 States can refer to 
adjudication or international arbitration or subject the dispute to 
compulsory nonbinding conciliation.179 Not surprisingly, Article 14 of 
the UNFCCC “has not yet been relied upon as a jurisdictional basis 
for action, despite the significant . . . violations of obligations under 
the Convention.”180 Most cases brought before the Compliance 
Committee have concerned issues of procedural compliance.181  
 Given the fact that the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol offer no 
provision for non-state actors to initiate compliance procedures,182 not 
surprisingly, climate change disputes have been adjudicated outside 
the climate change regime. Private actors have pursued their claims 
before a variety of different courts and tribunals at the national, 
regional, and international level.183 The choice of the relevant court 
or tribunal is of fundamental importance, as the entrenchment of the 
tribunal in a given institutional culture may affect the outcome of the 
dispute. Therefore, there is a degree of forum shopping for the most 
advantageous adjudicatory mechanism.184 
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 As mentioned, investment treaty arbitration has become the last 
frontier of climate change-related disputes and a steadily growing 
number a number of investment treaty arbitrations concern 
regulatory measures relating to climate change. Climate change-
related investment arbitrations are varied. They can encompass a 
claimant filing an investment treaty claim to enforce existing climate-
related laws to which the defendant is legally bound, to a claimant 
contending that climate change law is in breach of the relevant BIT 
provisions. The interests at stake may present a complexity unknown 
in other areas of the law, presenting a mixture of private and public 
interests which at times coincide (i.e., in which case, requiring 
climate change mitigation) and at times conflict (i.e., when the 
private interests clash with collective entitlements).  
 Arbitral tribunals are called to fill a “governance gap.” Arbitral 
awards—the decisions of arbitral tribunals—can become a tool of 
global climate governance, serving as a “de facto source of . . . climate 
policy with very real impacts on the regulatory landscape.”185 At the 
same time, the lack of a clear path to follow in settling such issues 
suggests that climate-related investment disputes can constitute a 
“legitimacy minefield” for the arbitral tribunals.186 In international 
(investment) law, debates over the extent of arbitral lawmaking 
authority are common.187 There is no settled approach to the question 
as to whether arbitrators should conform to strict legalism and show 
deference to the regulatory autonomy of the state or adopt a proactive 
approach to fill gaps in the law. Certainly, however, the effects of a 
given dispute reverberate beyond the parties to the same and can 
shape future decision making of governments, pressure corporations 
to invest in (or divest themselves of) a given sector activities, and 
reconfigure the public discourse.188 Given the multiplicity of fora 
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adjudicating climate change-related disputes and the commonality of 
the relevant issues, there is an opportunity for transnational judicial 
dialogue and cross-pollination of concepts.189 Yet, there is a risk that 
arbitral tribunals will focus on the persuasive precedents of previous 
arbitral awards, not necessarily dealing with climate change-related 
disputes. A de facto system of precedent has coalesced in investment 
treaty arbitration:190 the persuasiveness of previous arbitral tribunal 
awards can overshadow the potential merits of the jurisprudence of 
other courts and tribunals. The selection of the persuasive precedent 
matters, as it can influence the outcome of the proceedings.  
 Not only can arbitral awards contribute significantly to the 
development of international investment law, but they also can 
contribute, albeit indirectly, to the development of climate 
governance. These cases will contribute to the development of 
international investment law as they involve the interpretation of key 
standards of protection, including indirect expropriation, non-
discrimination, and fair and equitable treatment, among others. 
These cases will also contribute to the development of the climate 
regime. Investment treaty arbitral tribunals are of limited 
jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate on the eventual violation of climate 
change law. Yet, climate change-related arbitrations demonstrate 
that investor–state arbitration can constitute an unintended but 
effective tool for enforcing climate change law in mixed disputes (i.e., 
between states and non-state actors). These cases may also generate 
debate on the interplay, conflict, and/or mutual supportiveness 
between these branches of public international law, and, more 
generally, on the unity or fragmentation of international law.  
 From a climate law perspective, two types of claims have 
emerged. First, investors who have invested in renewable energy 
have challenged regulatory changes allegedly affecting their 
investments. In these cases, international investment law is being 
used as a legal mechanism to protect economic interests of businesses 
investing in renewable energy. In these cases international 
investment law is being used as a shield to protect climate change 
mitigation measures. However, it will be shown that in repealing 
and/or modifying climate change mitigation measures, the host state 
may be pursuing other fundamental objectives, including human 
rights. In times of austerity, cuts in public expenditure can be 
unavoidable and may be spread among different economic sectors. If 
host states could not adjust their climate energy policies to provide 
essential services with respect to fundamental human rights, then 
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this situation could lead to a regulatory chill, as states would be wary 
of adopting climate change mitigation measures in the first place.  
 Second, investors who have invested in polluting activities have 
filed investor–state arbitrations, deeming Kyoto-related measures as 
a violation of the host state obligations under its international 
investment treaties. In these cases, international investment law is 
being used as a sword to protect private property against climate 
change mitigation measures.  
 This Part now examines these two different facets of the relevant 
arbitrations. As most of these disputes have been filed only recently 
and are pending at the time of this writing, it is not possible to 
foresee whether these disputes will be settled by the parties and, if 
so, on which terms, or whether—and if so how—they will be 
adjudicated by the relevant arbitral tribunals. It is nonetheless 
timely and appropriate to provide a brief overview of the relevant 
issues that have arisen in these emerging disputes.  
A. Renewable Energy Investors as Claimants 
 Renewable energy-related disputes have emerged as the new 
frontier of confrontation between investors and states. A number of 
countries have adopted incentives to attract investments in the 
renewable energy sector and to increase the production of clean 
energy. The rationales for public support of renewable energy are 
multifold. In general terms, public support of renewables is needed 
because energy production from renewables is more expensive than 
(and not yet competitive with) energy generated from fossil fuels. 
Moreover, energy security calls for the diversification of energy 
sources away from traditional sources. In response to the current 
global financial crisis, however, states have implemented 
unprecedented emergency measures to prevent systemic collapse and 
return to economic stability.191 These emergency measures include 
measures affecting the renewable energy sector. Such measures have 
triggered a wave of investment disputes against states for potential 
breaches of investment treaty provisions due to the negative impact 
of such measures on foreign investments.192 These investor–state 
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arbitration claims expose the state to potential liability. Investor and 
host state priorities tend to diverge in times of a financial crisis. 
Investors are concerned with the protection of their investments. The 
renewable energy sector is “capital intensive,” and “government 
subsidies are still necessary to make them economically viable.”193 A 
sovereign’s priority, however, is working out a prompt and effective 
resolution of the crisis. Therefore, finding a balance between the right 
of a sovereign to respond to a debt crisis and the protection of 
investors’ rights under BITs is a source of international tension. 
 Many of the pending disputes have arisen out of the same set of 
facts. A number of EU countries—including Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Spain, Italy, and Greece—have adopted incentives to 
attract investments in the renewable energy sector and to increase 
the production of clean energy.194 Among these incentives was a 
“feed-in tariff” (FIT) (i.e., a fixed electricity purchase price set higher 
than market rates and of guaranteed duration).195 This and other 
incentives made the renewable energy market particularly attractive 
to investors since they reduced financing costs.196  
 After the advent of the global financial crisis, however, a number 
of governments realized that rapid rates of growth in the renewable 
energy sector could create an “unsustainable social burden”197 and 
began to change their renewable energy policies, repealing some of 
these incentives, eventually reducing the FITs.198 In fact, as a policy, 
FITs cost governments a lot, potentially contributing to the escalation 
of their deficits.199 In a number of arbitrations, foreign investors are 
contending that these regulatory changes amount to a violation of the 
relevant investment treaties’ provisions. This section examines a 
number of case studies. 
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 Consider, for example, Bulgaria. After adopting the 2007 
Renewable and Alternative Energy Sources and Biofuels Act 
(RAESBA),200 a new regulation governing investments in renewable 
energy sources, Bulgaria soon “reached its targets and the 
governmental authorities took measures to restrict the available 
incentives.”201 As a result, the 2011 Energy from Renewable Sources 
Act (ERSA) replaced the RAESBA.202 A 20 percent tax was imposed 
on the income of solar energy producers, many of which are foreign 
owned, and the preferential rates for electricity generated by wind 
and solar power plants were substantially reduced. Several 
multinational companies considered the possibility “to protect their 
rights before an international arbitral tribunal.”203 In 2013 EVN, an 
Austrian company, which had invested in the energy sector, filed an 
investment treaty arbitration against Bulgaria.204 EVN based its 
claim on the Energy Charter Treaty and the Austria–Bulgaria BIT. 
EVN acquired the privatized grid operation and electricity supply 
companies in the southern part of Bulgaria in the 2000s.205 The 
dispute was sparked by the reform in the renewable energy sector. 
EVN was under an obligation to pay a preferential tariff to the solar 
energy producers but, allegedly, Bulgarian authorities failed to do 
so.206 This led EVN to bring a claim against the country after a three-
month “cooling-off” negotiation period provided for by the Energy 
Charter Treaty.207 While the notice of arbitration is not publicly 
available, potential breaches, which may be alleged by the foreign 
investors, include breach of fair and equitable treatment due to lack 
of a predictable and stable legal framework, breach of legitimate 
expectations, and indirect expropriation of the investor’s asset value. 
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In parallel, reportedly, more than fifty solar companies have lodged a 
complaint against the state’s measures at the European Court of 
Human Rights, alleging violations of the right to property in breach 
of Article 1 Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.208  
 The Czech Republic is also facing several claims in relation to its 
repealing favorable treatment of solar-generated energy.209 In 2005, it 
had adopted a generous FIT payable to “solar generators who fed 
electricity into the grid.”210 In 2010, however, the FIT was reduced.211 
A bloc of ten foreign investors filed a joint request for arbitration in 
May 2013, complaining of various measures allegedly affecting their 
investments in the Czech Republic’s photovoltaic (pv) sector.212 The 
claimants relied on a number of treaties in their joint request, 
including the Energy Charter Treaty and Czech BITs with the 
Netherlands, Germany, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and the United 
Kingdom.213 The claimants contended that these rollbacks constitute 
an indirect expropriation of their investments and a breach of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard.214 The Czech Republic, however, 
objected to the claimants’ efforts to join in a single arbitration.215 It 
treated the arbitration request as a request to consolidate all of the 
claims and indicated which claims it would consent to arbitrate 
together—“because certain claimants were alleged affiliates and/or 
invested in a common investment in the Czech Republic.”216 
Therefore, six arbitral tribunals have been constituted out of the joint 
claim.217 In addition, some German investors have filed an investor–
state arbitration under the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules and the Germany-Czech 
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Republic BIT.218 The latter claim differs from the previous claims 
because it does not rely on the Energy Charter Treaty.219 The reasons 
for the failure to invoke the protections of the treaty are not clear. 
However, “one explanation could lie in the ECT’s Article 21, which 
places important limits on the claims that can be raised in relation to 
taxation measures.”220  
 Spain is facing a steadily lengthening number of investment 
treaty claims in relation to its own reductions of incentives that it 
offered previously to investors in renewable energy production.221 
Reportedly, Spain reduced these incentives which constituted “a 
significant drag on the Spanish economy.”222 In InfraRed 
Environmental Infrastructure GP Limited and others v. Spain,223 the 
claimant, a UK-based investment fund, which had acquired equity 
participation in solar projects in Spain, alleges that legal reforms 
affecting the renewable energy sector constitute violations of the 
Energy Charter Treaty.224 A number of companies have brought 
analogous cases against Spain before the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),225 the Arbitration 
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Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce,226 or ad hoc 
arbitral tribunals pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules.227  
 Other member states of the European Union are facing similar 
challenges. On February 21, 2014, the ICSID registered the first 
known claim filed against Italy for alleged violations of the ECT.228 
The claimants are investors in a photovoltaic energy generation 
project.229 The claim is related to the notorious “spalmaincentivi,” the 
decision taken by the government to decrease incentives granted in 
the past to renewable energy producers. Italy has recently withdrawn 
from the ECT because of cost-cutting efforts.230 Under Article 47 of 
the ECT, the withdrawal will take effect one year after the date of 
notification.231 However, the ECT will continue to apply to 
investments made before such date for a period of further twenty 
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years.232 Greece has also reduced the supposedly guaranteed 
prices.233  
 Analogous investment disputes are arising under Chapter 11 of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).234 In Mesa 
Power v. Canada,235 a Texas-based energy company has brought an 
arbitral claim against Canada in relation to the province of Ontario’s 
renewable energy program.236 The investor, which owns four wind 
farms in Ontario, contends that the province changed the rules by 
which renewable energy producers can obtain power purchase 
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agreements, favoring other investors. Ontario’s 2009 Green Energy 
Act is a climate change-related measure aimed at promoting 
renewable energy production and economic growth. Under the Act’s 
Feed-In Tariff Program (FIT Program), the Ontario Power Authority 
secures renewable energy through long-term purchase contracts with 
producers of this energy. Under the program, companies benefit from 
a preferential tariff rate fixed for twenty years. In Ontario, the Green 
Energy Act has been controversial because of the preferential 
treatment granted to renewable energy producers vis-à-vis producers 
of non-renewable energy. When the relevant authorities introduced 
some changes to the rules for awarding FIT program contracts, the 
investor filed a notice of arbitration, contending that these regulatory 
changes violated the fair and equitable treatment standard. The 
investor also contended that a green energy investment agreement 
with a Korean-based company discriminated against other energy 
producers thus amounting to a breach of the national treatment and 
most favored nation treatment clauses. Finally, the company alleges 
that Ontario is imposing a number of local content requirements that 
amount to prohibited performance requirements under NAFTA 
Article 1106.  
B. Challenges to Climate Change-Related Regulatory Measures 
 Investors who have invested in polluting activities can bring a 
second type of investment dispute, challenging climate change-
related regulatory measures. Foreign investors can and have argued 
that Kyoto-related measures violate host state obligations under its 
international investment treaties, including non-discrimination, the 
fair and equitable treatment standard, and the prohibition on 
unlawful expropriation.237 Reportedly, investors have threatened to 
file investor–state arbitrations if climate change regulation did not 
include compensation mechanisms for their alleged losses for 
reducing carbon emissions.238 In addition, foreign companies could 
contend that moratoria on polluting activities amount to breaches of 
investment treaty provisions. The subsections below examine the 
types of claims that can and have been brought.  
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1. Expropriation 
 Foreign investors could (and have) contend(ed) that moratoria on 
polluting activities amount to a form of expropriation and require 
compensation. For instance, an oil and gas firm has filed an 
investment arbitration against Canada over a moratorium on drilling 
techniques (“fracking”) in Quebec under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.239 
Although the prohibition of fracking is not a climate change-related 
measure, similar cases can and have arisen with other moratoria 
related to climate change.  
 For instance, in Vattenfall v. Germany, a Swedish company sued 
Germany under the ECT, challenging a regulation requiring the 
installation of GHG emissions controls on a proposed coal-fired power 
plant.240 According to Vattenfall, local opposition to the plant due to 
climate change concerns241 delayed the issuance of the required 
permits for emissions control and water use. In August 2010, the 
parties settled the dispute, and the proceedings before the ICSID 
were suspended. The Government agreed that it would issue the 
relevant permits and relieved the company of its earlier commitments 
to the Hamburg Government that aimed to reduce the plant’s 
environmental impact on the Elbe River.  
 Although the case was settled, this section proposes a solution 
that may help adjudicating similar expropriation claims in the future. 
In this regard, it argues that the “police powers” doctrine should 
apply to this type of climate change-related investment dispute 
claim.242 According to this doctrine, general regulation, adopted bona 
fide and in a non-discriminatory manner to protect public health or 
safety, or to prevent a public nuisance, does not amount to 
expropriation and cannot be compensated.243 In fact, states do have 
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the right—and, some would argue, the duty—to restrict private 
property to prevent a public nuisance.244 Few would contest that 
climate change is a severe type of nuisance or common concern of 
humankind and that states have the duty to prevent and/or mitigate 
its effects. The legitimate purpose of climate change-related measures 
can also be inferred by the fact that they are based on scientific 
evidence245 as recognized by several international law instruments 
ratified by the overwhelming majority of states.  
 The police powers doctrine allows states to adopt measures to 
prevent a public nuisance such as climate change. It also allows 
arbitral tribunals to strike a balance between the objectives pursued 
by climate change law and those pursued by international investment 
law. Climate change is a common concern of humankind; there seems 
to be little question about the need to adopt climate change policies. 
The protection of foreign direct investment is also an important 
interest of states, as it can lead to the economic development of the 
host state. The key issue will be applying international investment 
law while taking into account climate change law.  
 At the same time, the concept of police powers is not unlimited. 
Concepts such as reasonableness and proportionality may help the 
arbitrators to assess whether the modalities of state regulation are 
suitable and appropriate to achieve the state objective of climate 
change mitigation and do not constitute a camouflaged indirect 
expropriation of the given foreign investment. For instance, in a 
recent arbitration, Servier v. Poland,246 concerning the denial of 
marketing authorizations to certain medicines in the exercise of its 
police powers to regulate public health, the Tribunal held that while 
it should “accord due deference to the decisions of specialized . . . 
administrators,” it “w[ould] also consider the manner in which those 
decisions were taken and their effect on the Claimants’ 
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investments.”247 In particular, the Tribunal found the denial of 
marketing authorization to be discriminatory and disproportionate, 
thus amounting to an unlawful expropriation.  
2. Discrimination  
 Foreign investors (in particular those coming from states outside 
the Kyoto system) could bring discrimination claims against host 
states’ regulatory measures to promote investments under the Kyoto 
system.248 This seems a remote hypothesis, given the almost 
universal ratification of the UNFCCC and, albeit to a much lesser 
extent, the Kyoto Protocol. Yet, incentives offered by a state for 
renewable energy projects could be perceived as discriminatory 
against carbon intensive businesses.  
 In this respect, a critical issue will distinguish the climate-
friendly and carbon-intensive projects in light of the host state’s 
Kyoto commitments. Arguably, the Kyoto requirements constitute a 
legitimate ground for distinguishing different economic activities. In 
an earlier arbitration concerning the construction of a parking area in 
the proximity of a World Heritage Site, the Arbitral Tribunal 
distinguished two projects on the basis of their different impacts on 
the conservation of the site, in light of the host state’s commitments 
under the World Heritage Convention.249 Similarly, one could argue 
that carbon-intensive investments and climate-friendly economic 
activities are not “like investments” because they have different 
impacts on climate change. Therefore, the host state would be able to 
defend its regulatory measures on the ground that no discrimination 
is at issue since there is a legitimate distinction between economic 
activities, which have different impacts on climate change. 
 Even prima facie discriminatory measures may be found to be 
justified because of the novelty and complexity of climate change 
regulation. For instance, a major steel producer, Arcelor, took action 
before the (then) European Court of Justice (ECJ),250 alleging 
discrimination in the design of the EU Emission Trading Scheme 
(ETS).251 The company contended that its emission allocation 
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discriminated against its investment as compared to other competing 
sectors,252 requested the partial annulment of the European 
legislation, and claimed damages.253 The (now) General Court of the 
European Union,254 however, dismissed the claim, supporting the 
scheme’s incremental approach of including some sectors while 
excluding others.255 The court acknowledged that the various 
industrial sectors were comparable polluters and that all carbon 
emissions affect the global climate. However, the court held that the 
differential treatment was justified because of the novelty and 
complexity of the scheme.256 According to the court, these features 
allowed a step-by-step approach.257 In contrast, discrimination based 
on nationality may be found to be unjustifiable. For instance, in 
Nykomb v. Latvia, a foreign investor successfully argued that Latvia 
had discriminated against its investment, supporting domestic 
operators while withdrawing its support to foreigners.258  
3. Stabilization Clause 
 Other claims could be raised in relation to stabilization clauses 
in contracts between host states and foreign investors. In general 
terms, stabilization clauses aim to insulate the project from adverse 
regulatory changes. While stabilization clauses take different forms, 
they aim to immunize the investment from political risks, freezing 
the law applicable to the investment to that which was in force when 
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the parties signed the contract. Authors have cautioned that public 
welfare regulation may be accommodated through appropriate 
drafting259 or interpretation of stabilization clauses.260 
4. Fair and Equitable Treatment 
 In addition to the mentioned claims of expropriation, 
discrimination and lack of stability, foreign investors could contend 
that changes in the regulatory framework of the host state amounts 
to a violation of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard. A 
number of arbitral tribunals have interpreted the FET standard 
extensively so as to include the obligation on the part of the state to 
protect an investor’s legitimate expectations and provide a stable 
legal environment. For instance, in an ECT arbitration, a company 
won a case against the host state for a change of government policy, 
which altered an incentive system for green investment.261  
 Although the FET standard seems particularly vague, it does not 
protect foreign investors against every type of regulatory change. Is it 
legitimate for the investor to expect host state not/never to take 
climate change mitigation measures if they are contradictory to 
statements made or the legal framework in existence? In broad 
brushstrokes, protected legitimate expectations stem from specific 
statements by the relevant state authorities, or can arise from the 
host state regulatory framework in the event that the state in 
question has induced a given investor’s confidence that the legal 
framework would remain unchanged for some time. On the one hand, 
it may be difficult to argue that climate change mitigation measures 
are not foreseeable, as climate change has made headlines. On the 
other, as Schill points out, “[T]he protection of the investor’s 
legitimate expectations does not make the domestic legal framework 
unchangeable or subject every change to a compensation 
requirement.”262 In this regard, the Saluka Tribunal held that 
ascertaining whether fair and equitable treatment was breached 
required “a weighing of the Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable 
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expectations on the one hand and the Respondent’s legitimate 
regulatory interests on the other.”263 
VIII. CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 
 What are the main challenges posed by climate change-related 
investment arbitrations? This Part highlights the main issues that 
can facilitate and/or impede consideration of the public interest in 
investment treaty arbitration.  
A. Lack of Transparency 
 From a procedural perspective, the general lack of transparency 
of investment treaty arbitration is of particular concern. Due to the 
particular features of investment arbitration and the fact that none of 
the mentioned disputes have been settled yet, very little information 
is available. While the number of investment disputes relating to 
renewable energy is growing steadily as reported by the news, very 
little is known about the claims and arguments of the parties.  
 The Energy Charter Secretariat regularly compiles and updates 
a list of the relevant investor–state disputes related to energy—and 
thus also renewable energy.264 However, under the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT) “there is no requirement that such disputes be notified 
to the Secretariat,” nor is the Secretariat involved in the 
administration of investment disputes. Therefore, the information 
available on the Energy Charter’s website “relies on various public 
sources . . . and includes links to publicly available documents” but 
“completeness cannot be guaranteed.”265  
 The ICSID website lists all of the cases that are registered at the 
Center.266 Yet, the list provides very little information, generally 
mentioning the sector of investors’ activity, the date of registration, 
and details about the constitution of the arbitral tribunals.267 
Moreover, the ICSID website does not generally publish the notice of 
claim let alone the statement of defense and subsequent documents 
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submitted by the parties.268 If the parties so agree, the ICSID 
publishes the award on jurisdiction and the final award.269 The 
parties, however, may also opt for confidentiality or request the 
redaction of specific parts of the awards to protect personal data, 
business information, and the like. The Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce and the International Chamber of Commerce provide even 
less information. 
B. Inconsistent Awards 
 Procedurally, questions arise as to whether the multiplicity of 
claims and the diversity of arbitral tribunals can lead to divergent 
awards on the interpretation of recurring legal and factual issues, as 
happened most notably in the many claims arising against Argentina 
in the aftermath of that country’s earlier financial crisis. Inconsistent 
awards can impede the harmonious development of international 
investment law and jeopardize the coherence and predictability of the 
same. At the same time, however, inconsistent awards can also 
promote fruitful dialectics within the system, and improve the 
ultimate quality of the awards. In fact, if one looks at the 
jurisprudence related to Argentina’s financial crisis, an initial stream 
of awards consistently holding Argentina liable and awarding 
damages has been partially annulled by Annulment Committees, and 
another stream of awards have emerged, which has considered 
Argentina’s response to the financial crisis a legitimate response in 
light of the public interest.270  
C. Multiparty Arbitration 
 Another interesting procedural issue characterizing some climate 
change-related disputes is the possibility of recourse to multiparty 
arbitrations. The Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 
                                                                                                                            
 268.  Id. 
 269.  See ICSID Convention art. 48(5), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf [http://perma.cc/EF9E-J6VL] (archived 
Sept. 19, 2015) (“The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the 
parties.”). 
 270.  See, e.g, LG&E Energy Corp. et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, Award, ¶ 3 (July 25, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0462.pdf [http://perma.cc/H8E6-CYJQ] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (holding 
Argentina liable for damages to the claimants “for breaches of the treaty, except during 
the period o the State of Necessity”); see also Continental Casualty v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 320 (Sept. 5, 2008), 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/ContinentalCasualtyAward.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/J7ZA-U5JK] (archived Sept. 20, 2015). 
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Convention)271 and BITs are silent on the issue of mass claims.272 
However, arbitral tribunals have allowed such claims. Given the fact 
that several disputes can arise out of the same set of facts and 
regulatory changes, several non-affiliated investors have attempted 
to bring their claims in a single proceeding. Mass claims concern 
different investments, albeit of an analogous type, and arise out of 
the same background facts and legal issues. From the investors’ 
perspective, multiparty arbitrations can promote procedural 
efficiency, coherent results and the participation of smaller investors 
who otherwise could not afford to file any claim. In fact, because 
investment arbitration can be very expensive,273 mass claims can 
provide access to justice for individuals who otherwise could not 
afford to obtain legal representation before arbitral tribunals. From 
the state’s perspective, mass claims can be cost-effective, avoid 
duplicate efforts to resolve common issues, and prevent inconsistent 
awards. However, the same advantages can also constitute 
disadvantages for the host state. In fact, mass claims prevent the 
state from improving and adapting its litigation strategies. Since 
even small investors can join the proceedings, these risk 
overburdening the competent authorities. Moreover, the existence of 
parallel disputes allows the state to diversify the risk of losing or 
winning claims. In other words, the state can make good use of 
inconsistent awards, filing claims for annulment against those 
awards that ruled in favor of the investor (at least within the ICSID 
system). Because of these considerations, generally states have 
opposed collective proceedings.  
                                                                                                                            
 271.  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention or Washington Convention), Washington, 
18 March 1965, in force 14 October 1966, 575 UNTS 159. 
 272.  No provision of the ICSID convention addresses the issue of mass claims. 
However, Article 44 of the Convention states, inter alia, that “[i]f any question of 
procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any 
rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the question.” Therefore, arbitral 
tribunals have relied on this provision to allow mass claims. See Abaclat v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
¶¶ 517–19 (Aug. 4, 2011) (considering the silence of the ICSID Convention on the issue 
of mass claims as allowing such proceedings. However, one of the arbitrators, Judge 
Georges Abi-Saab, issued a dissenting opinion); see also Alemanni v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 
323–25 (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw 
4061.pdf [http://perma.cc/9LUR-MCQM] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (deeming collective 
proceedings compatible with the ICSID Convention and allowing the mass proceedings 
to continue).  
 273.  See Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration, GLOBAL ARB. 
REV., 1, 2 (Mar. 24, 2014), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32513/ 
(subscription required) [http://perma.cc/T2TK-MQKM] (archived Oct. 15, 2015) (“[T]he 
average party costs were quite similar, at $4,437,000 for claimants and $4,559,000 for 
respondents.”). 
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 For instance, in PV Investors v. Spain, several investors filed an 
investor–state arbitration against Spain due to the recent regulatory 
changes in the renewable energy sector. Although Spain agreed to 
constitute a single arbitral tribunal, it then raised a jurisdictional 
objection to the claimants’ bid to have their claims heard in a 
“consolidated” fashion.274 The UNCITRAL Tribunal, however, 
rejected its objections and affirmed its jurisdiction.275 Other arbitral 
tribunals have heard consolidated claims. For instance, the Abaclat 
Tribunal accepted the first mass claim arbitration consisting of 
60,000 Italian bondholders.276 Argentina argued that consent to 
arbitration does not extend to mass claims.277 In debating whether 
express consent was required or whether general consent in BITs 
would suffice, the ICSID tribunal took a pragmatic approach. It held 
that mass claims would be an efficient means of dispute settlement as 
opposed to considering the investor claims individually.278 The 
Tribunal reasoned that it would be contrary to the ICSID and BITs’ 
objective to deny the investors an efficient remedy to the dispute. 
Subsequent arbitral tribunals have adopted the same approach.279 As 
the Alemanni Tribunal puts it, “[C]onsent is not more valid by being 
given twice, any more than it is less valid for having been given only 
once.”280  
D. Private v. Public Interest 
 More substantively, these cases show that climate policies may 
have a varied impact on different actors. Generally, climate policies 
benefit the public at large because they reduce greenhouse gases, 
                                                                                                                            
 274.  See Peterson, supra note 219.  
 275.  See Luke E. Peterson, Intra-EU Treaty Claims Controversy: New Decisions 
and Developments in Claims Brought by EU Investors vs. Spain and Hungary, IAR 
(Dec. 24, 2014). 
 276.  See Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 216 (Aug. 4, 2011). 
 277.  See id. ¶ 467. 
 278.  See id. ¶ 545(ii) (“The measures that Argentina would need to take to face 
60,000 [separate] proceedings would be a much bigger challenge to Argentina’s 
effective defense rights . . . .”).  
 279.  See Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 119–22 (Feb. 8, 2013), http:/ 
/www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1276.pdf [http://perma.cc/V9 
DG-WKEH] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (embracing the essence of Abaclat’s “mass claim” 
through a “multi-party” approach for a 90 claimant action); see also Alemanni v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, ¶¶ 261–67 (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/ default/files/ 
case-documents/italaw4061.pdf [http://perma.cc/9LUR-MCQM] (archived Sept. 20, 
2015). 
 280.  Alemanni, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, ¶ 269. 
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which not only worsen people’s quality of life but can also determine 
drought, famine, and rising sea levels. In specific cases, there may be 
mutual supportiveness among climate change-related measures, the 
economic interests of businesses, and the human rights of local 
communities. This scenario is enhanced by the recent establishment 
of state incentives for the promotion of renewable energy and the 
acknowledged linkage between the green economy and sustainable 
development.281  
 Yet, climate policies can affect the economic interests of 
corporations, which need to invest in technological upgrades or even 
convert a given business to a more eco-friendly economic activity. 
Even investments in the renewable energy sector entail significant 
economic risks. In fact, the profitability of clean energy projects often 
depends on subsidies and feed-in tariffs. There is a risk that “once 
investments are made, public authorities will be tempted to 
reconsider their commitments.”282 Cuts in subsidies for renewable 
energy have been criticized by both investors and environmentalists. 
These cuts may prevent other investors from investing in a renewable 
energy sector.  
 However, cuts in subsidies for renewable energy may be 
indispensable to prevent a financial crisis with foreseeable impact on 
the polity of the host state. In this context, the arbitrators will have 
to take into account the various circumstances—financial crisis, state 
of necessity, and even human rights considerations—that may 
eventually justify a change in the relevant regulatory measures.  
 These cases will contribute to the development of the investment 
and climate regimes; at the same time, it would be advisable that 
practitioners and adjudicators take their impact into account. Given 
the fact that arbitral tribunals often adjudicate issues related to the 
public interest, an equilibrated approach to interpretation seems 
demanded by the need to balance the interests of the state and those 
of the investor. In this regard, some scholars have argued that 
“preference for one interpretation over another should be based on a 
comparison of the consequences that would be likely to follow from 
                                                                                                                            
 281.  See U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development, The Future We Want, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.216/16 (June 20–21, 2012), http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/ 
documents/814UNCSD%20REPORT%20final%20revs.pdf [http://perma.cc/93EM-NUQ 
Z] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (promoting sustainable development through social and 
economic growth); see also The Future We Want, G. A. Res. 66/288, annex, ¶ 12 (July 
27, 2012), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/66/288&Lang=E 
[http://perma.cc/Y8PJ-7JQQ] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (recognizing a commitment to 
sustainable development). 
 282.  Anatole Boute, The Potential Contribution of International Investment 
Protection Law to Combat Climate Change, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 333, 
342 (2009). 
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each interpretation.”283 Among these consequences, the authors 
include both the flows of foreign direct investment and the realization 
of human rights and environmental conservation into host states.284  
 For instance, in Continental Casualty v. Argentina, a case arose 
from measures taken by the state in the wake of its economic crisis in 
2001–2002.285 The Tribunal determined that the non-precluded 
measures clause286 should be interpreted as absolving the host state 
from liability and considered that:  
[T]he Government’s efforts struck an appropriate balance between th[e] aim of 
respecting its international obligations and the responsibility of any 
government towards the country’s population: it is self-evident that not every 
sacrifice can properly be imposed on a country’s people in order to safeguard a 
certain policy that would ensure full respect towards international obligations 
in the financial sphere, before a breach of those obligations can be considered 
justified as being necessary under this BIT. The standard of reasonableness 
and proportionality do not require as much.287  
E. The Evolving Role of the European Commission in Investor–State 
Arbitration 
 The evolving role of the European Commission in energy-related 
investor–state arbitrations is part of a larger series of ongoing 
“thematic dialogues” (on monetary policy, human rights, criminal 
justice, and security) between public international law and European 
Union (EU) Law. Whether EU law is just a component of public 
international law being embedded in and interdependent with the 
same, or whether it constitutes an autonomous legal order of a quasi-
constitutional nature remains a debated issue.  
 With regard to energy-related disputes, the European Union has 
played an active and ambitious, albeit controversial, role, seeking 
permission to intervene as amicus curiae in a number of 
                                                                                                                            
 283.  Jonathan Bonnitcha, Outline of a Normative Framework for Evaluating 
Interpretations of Investment Treaty Protections, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION 117, 118 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011). 
 284.  See id. 
 285.  Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case ARB/03/9, 
Award, ¶ 100 (Sept. 5, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/documents/ContinentalCasualty 
Award.pdf [http://perma.cc/J7ZA-U5JK] (archived Sept. 20, 2015). 
 286.  “Non-precluded measures” include “measures necessary for the 
maintenance of public order” whose adoption is allowed under the relevant BITs. See, 
e.g., Article XI of the US–Argentina BIT (providing that “[t]his treaty shall not 
preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of 
public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential 
security interests.”); The Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 
U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/ 
TreatyFile/127 [http://perma.cc/V8SN-NXEK] (archived Sept. 20, 2015).  
 287.  Continental Casualty, ICSID Case ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 227. 
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arbitrations.288 Amicus curiae briefs create “possibilities for regime 
interaction.”289 Arbitral tribunals can accept non-party submissions if 
they consider that such briefs “would assist the tribunal in the 
determination of a factual or legal issue . . . by bringing a perspective, 
particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the 
disputing parties” or “would address a matter within the scope of the 
dispute.”290  
 The move of the European Commission is grounded in two 
converging recent developments of EU governance. In recent years, 
the European Commission has “centralize[d] power in the hands of 
the [European Union]” in matters related to both climate change and 
foreign direct investments and has moved towards a greater 
harmonization in both areas.291 On the one hand, the European 
Union has “consciously positioned itself as ‘leading global action 
against climate change to 2020 and beyond.’”292 The renewable 
energy directive, Directive 2009/28,293 “establishes a common 
framework for the promotion of energy from renewable sources and 
targets for 2020.”294 The directive aims at increasing the percentage 
share of energy from renewable sources in the European Union’s final 
consumption of energy to 20 percent by 2020.295 Key drivers of the 
renewable energy policy include economic competitiveness, climate 
change mitigation, and energy security.296 Under the framework, 
“mandatory national targets have been adopted,”297 and there is “a 
clear incentive for member states to create the necessary stable policy 
                                                                                                                            
 288.  See, e.g., AES Summit Generation Limited v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/22; Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19; Antin 
Infrastructure Servs. Luxembourg S.à.r.l. v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31; Eiser 
Infrastructure Limited v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36; RENERGY S.à.r.l. v. 
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/18.  
 289.  Young, supra note 149, at 153. 
 290.  ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) 
Rule 37, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partF.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/2FGC-HUAB] (archived Nov. 3, 2015). 
 291.  Scott, supra note 110, at 25–26. 
 292.  Id. at 28. 
 293.  See European Parliament and the Council on the Promotion of the Use of 
Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and Subsequently Repealing Directives 
2001/177/EC and 2003/30/EC., 2009, 2009/28/EC, http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ 
eur88009.pdf [http://perma.cc/3VGZ-JRKX] (archived Sept. 20, 2015). 
 294.  Philip Lowe, Regulating Renewable Energy in the European Union, 1 
RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL’Y REV. 17, 17 (2010). 
 295.  Arno Behrens, The Role of Renewables in the Interaction Between Climate 
Change Policy and Energy Security in Europe, 1 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL’Y REV. 
5, 12 (2010). 
 296.  See id. at 5, 12 (“[I]ncreasing deployment of renewable energy technologies 
can benefit the security of European energy supplies in several ways. Being largely 
domestically available . . . they have the potential to replace imported fossil . . . energy 
carriers, thus reducing import dependency.”). 
 297.  Lowe, supra note 294, at 17.  
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framework.”298 The Commission can bring infringement proceedings 
against a member state, if it fails to implement the directive or falls 
below its target.299 To meet the targets, the Union acknowledges that 
investments are necessary.300 The European Commission has 
confirmed that “it remains opposed to retroactive changes to 
renewable energy support schemes, while acknowledging that several 
Member States like Greece need to reduce their support to 
renewables in line with . . . cost-efficient levels to stabilize the 
system.”301  
 On the other hand, since the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, the European 
Union has acquired exclusive competence over foreign direct 
investment.302 In addition, the European Union and its member 
states are parties to the ECT.303 The participation of the European 
Union in a number of proceedings between EU member states and 
third countries is required by Regulation (EU) No. 1219/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012, 
establishing transitional arrangements for BITS between Member 
States and third countries.304 Although the European Union does not 
enjoy a “special procedural status” in investment arbitration, it is 
clear that it “is not a mere third party to proceedings concerning EU 
Member States and EU law.”305 In fact, while the European Union 
                                                                                                                            
 298.  Id. at 17–18. 
 299.  Id. at 18. 
 300.  Id. at 19. 
 301.  European Parliament: Notices From European Union Institutions, Bodies, 
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 305.  Carlos Gonzalez-Bueno & Laura Lozano, More than a Friend of the Court: 
The Evolving Role of the European Commission in Investor–State Arbitration, KLUWER 
ARB. BLOG (Jan. 26, 2015), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2015/01/26/more-
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can be acting in furtherance of the public interest and a desire of 
transparency, it has “direct legal interest in the outcome of the 
dispute.”306  
 The European Commission has intervened in a number of intra-
EU investor–state arbitrations as amicus curiae, challenging either 
the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction or the enforcement of its award. 
For instance, in Electrabel SA (Belgium) v. Hungary, the Commission 
intervened as amicus curiae and challenged the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction under the ECT. The Commission argued that Electrabel, 
in its capacity as an EU investor challenging an EU measure, should 
have brought its case before EU courts. The Tribunal dismissed the 
EU Commission’s argument that questions of interpretation of EU 
law fell exclusively under the jurisdiction of EU courts. It 
acknowledged that EU member states had agreed to submit questions 
of interpretation of EU law to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
now the CJEU. The Tribunal concluded, however, that this was not 
relevant to the case at hand as the claim was brought for a breach of 
the ECT, not of EU law.307 So far, arbitral tribunals have generally 
upheld their jurisdiction, despite the doctrinal debate over the 
interplay between ECT and EU law.308 
 Against this background, the European Commission has formally 
sought leave to present arguments in six parallel claims against the 
Czech Republic being arbitrated under the UNCITRAL procedural 
rules.309 These proceedings are brought by investors from the 
European Union and are based on the ECT and various intra–EU 
BITs.310 The Commission has raised “the possibility that these 
arbitrations may touch upon questions of EU law, and that former 
benefits and incentives accorded to solar investors could constitute . . 
. state aid that needed to be eliminated in order for the Czech 
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 306.  Id. 
 307.  See Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012, ¶ 5.32–35 
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 308.  See Peterson, supra note 275 (explaining that in the case EDF v. Hungary, 
an UNCITRAL Tribunal has affirmed its jurisdiction in relation to intra-EU claims 
concerning the violation of the ECT, despite the Commission’s intervention and 
opposition to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction).  
 309.  The six proceedings are: Antaris Solar & Dr. Michael Göde v. Czech 
Republic; Natland Investment Group NV, Natland Group Limited, G.I.H.G. Limited & 
Radiance Energy Holding S.A.R.L. v. Czech Republic; Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech 
Republic; ICW Europe Investments Limited v. Czech Republic; Photovoltaik Knopf 
Betriebs-GmbH v. Czech Republic; WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. Czech 
Republic. See Peterson, supra note 210. 
 310.  Id. 
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Republic to remain in compliance with EU law.”311 In other words, 
the measures challenged by foreign investors as breaches of the 
relevant BIT, could, according to the Commission, be measures that 
were in furtherance of the country’s EU law obligations. Accordingly, 
concerns arise that “any arbitral award compensating solar investors 
for losses arising out of the recent rollback of the earlier series of 
incentives could itself constitute state aid.”312 The move to intervene 
in the Czech cases forestalled other interventions in subsequent 
investment arbitrations.313 In fact, in November 2014, the 
Commission sought leave to intervene in Charanne and Construction 
Investments v. Spain and Isolux Infrastructure v. Spain, both under 
the SCC rules.314 Non-disputing parties’ applications have been filed 
to intervene in other energy-related ICSID cases against Spain;315 yet 
it remains unclear whether these applications have been filed by the 
Commission.  
 In an earlier ICSID arbitration, Micula and Others v. Romania, 
the EU Commission intervened to support Romania’s defense stating 
that “any payment of compensation arising out of this award would 
constitute illegal state aid under EU law and render the award 
unenforceable within the EU.”316 However, the Tribunal dismissed 
the argument, pinpointing that any ICSID award is binding and 
should be recognized and enforced without review by national 
courts.317  
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perma.cc/A4GM-SBFR] (archived Sept. 20, 2015).  
 317.  See id. ¶ 340.  
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 While the Commission has never published any of its 
applications to intervene or briefs themselves, it considers intra-EU 
investor–state arbitration incompatible with the EU legal order. 
According to the Commission the ECT cannot provide a basis for 
arbitration of intra-EU disputes because such disputes should be 
brought before the EU courts and tribunals.”318 Rather, in the 
Commission’s view, the ECT would create obligations “only between 
the Union and its Member States on the one hand and each of the 
other non-EU countries on the other.”319  
 The ECT, however, “contains no explicit disconnection 
provision.”320 Therefore, the question is whether there may be an 
implicit disconnection clause—a disconnection clause that should be 
inferred in the ECT based on treaty interpretation. While both EU 
member states and the European Union have ratified the ECT, the 
Commission seems to suggest that this was due to the fact that, at 
the time, the European Union did not have competence in the field of 
foreign direct investment. According to the Commission, the 
ratification of the ECT does not relieve member states from the 
obligations of EU law and from the jurisdiction of EU courts in 
settling energy disputes arising within the European Union.321  
 The argument of an implicit disconnection clause has not 
persuaded arbitral tribunals. For instance, in Electricité de France 
(EDF) v. Hungary, a still-unpublished award, the Tribunal reportedly 
“affirmed jurisdiction over and awarded damages in relation to 
alleged violations of the ECT . . . notwithstanding an intervention by 
the European Commission that had contested the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction over the claims.”322 In parallel, reportedly, “a pair of 
arbitral tribunals [has] deemed it premature for the European 
Commission to present written arguments in two [renewable energy-
related] pending arbitrations.”323 In another case, after failing to 
persuade arbitral tribunals to decline jurisdiction over intra-EU 
claims, the Commission enjoined the host state from paying the 
relevant arbitral award.324  
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Exclusive is the Jurisdiction of the ECJ?, 15 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 291, 292 
(2006) (discussing the possibility of parallel disputes brought before different 
international fora). 
 322.  Peterson, supra note 283. 
 323.  Id. 
 324.  See Christian Tjetie & Clemens Wackernagel, Outlawing Compliance? The 
Enforcement of Intra-EU Investment Awards and EU State Aid Law, 41 POL’Y PAPERS 
TRANSNAT’L ECON. L. 1, 8 (2014), http://tietje.jura.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/ 
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IX. DEALING WITH FRAGMENTATION  
 Climate change and foreign direct investments have traditionally 
been dealt with through separate subfields of international law. Rules 
belonging to different legal frameworks can conflict. Is international 
law a fragmented system where norms produced in one of its subfield 
can be neglected in another? How can arbitral tribunals address 
conflicts of norms? Is there a way to find a suitable balance between 
the public interest and investors’ entitlements? This Part examines 
these questions by adopting a two-fold approach. First, this Part will 
consider the steps that can be adopted de lege ferenda (the law as it 
should be in the future) for improving the synergy between 
international investment law and climate change law. Second, this 
Part will consider the panoply of options that adjudicators may take 
into account de lege lata (the law as it currently exists) when settling 
climate change-related investment disputes. 
A. De Lege Ferenda 
 Is there a need for specific amendments to BITs to accommodate 
environmental concerns, including climate change? In abstract terms, 
there is a general compatibility between different international law 
instruments, and many apparent conflicts of norms can be solved via 
treaty interpretation. Most investment treaties do not include 
reference to environmental concerns in general or climate change in 
particular; they tend to be short treaties that include the standards of 
treatment and a clause on dispute settlement. This does not mean 
that environmental concerns are completely irrelevant to 
international investment law and arbitration.  
 Although not strictly indispensable, some steps can be adopted 
de lege ferenda for improving the mutual supportiveness between 
international investment law and climate change law. In recent 
years, international investment law has gone through a phase of 
rebalancing aimed at re-empowering states and aligning investment 
protection with other policy objectives.325 Recent investment treaties 
have expressly included reference to climate change in their 
preambles326 or have included environmental measures in carve-outs. 
                                                                                                                            
PolicyPaper/PolicyPaper_No41.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z97C-7CGZ] (archived Sept. 20, 
2015) (explaining that in Micula v. Romania the European Commission warned that 
“[t]he execution of such award can thus not take place if it would contradict the rules of 
EU State aid policy”).  
 325.  See José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 223, 231 
(2011) (pinpointing that “[t]he regime most criticized for ignoring the will of states has 
become the foremost example of their persistent power.”).  
 326.  See, e.g., Agreement on Free Trade and Economic Partnership Between 
Japan and the Swiss Confederation, Japan-Switz., preamble, Feb. 19, 2009, 2642 
U.N.T.S. 3 (reaffirming “their commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human 
 
1344  VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [vol. 48:1285 
General carve outs clarify that bona fide regulation designed and 
applied to protect public welfare objectives, such as protecting the 
environment, does not amount to indirect expropriation.327 The 
inclusion of a provision on general exceptions can allow states to 
adopt, inter alia, environmental measures.328 Certainly climate 
change is an environmental concern. More specific provisions exclude 
environmental measures from the scope of the dispute settlement 
mechanism under the treaty.329 The Energy Charter Treaty adopts a 
something-in-between approach as it refers to climate change in its 
preamble330 and other provisions.331 Reference to common concerns 
such as climate change and/or multilateral environmental 
agreements in the preambles of international investment agreements 
is a welcome move as it can foster cross-pollination of ideas and an 
increased coherence between different branches of international law. 
The same is true for carve outs and general exceptions.  
                                                                                                                            
rights” and their “determin[ation], in implementing this Agreement, to seek to preserve 
and protect the environment, to promote the optimal use of natural resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development and to adequately address 
the challenges of climate change.”). 
 327.  See, e.g., Norway Model BIT Treaty, draft version 130515, art. 12, May 13 
2015, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/e47326b61f424d4c9c3d470896492623/ 
draft-model-agreement-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8YF-C6MK] (archived Sept. 20, 
2015) (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 
maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Agreement that it 
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner 
sensitive to health, safety, human rights, labour rights, resource management or 
environmental concerns.”). 
 328.  See id. art. 24 (“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not 
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between investments or between investors, or a disguised restriction on 
international [trade or] investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to 
prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing measures necessary: i. to protect public 
morals or to maintain public order; ii. to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
iii. to secure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement; iv. for the protection of national treasures of artistic, 
historic or archaeological value; or v. for the protection of the environment.”). 
 329.  See, e.g., Agreement Between Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and 
Barbados for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Belg.-Barb., art. 
11, May 19, 2009, http://arbitration.org/sites/default/files/bit/belgium_barbados_ 
english.pdf [http://perma.cc/T7SK-37MY] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (recognizing the 
“right of each Contracting Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental 
regulation”).  
 330.  See Energy Charter Treaty, Annex 1 to the Final Act of the Conference on 
the European Energy Charter, preamble, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360 (1995) 
(“[R]ecalling the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its protocols, and other 
international environmental agreements with energy-related aspects; and Recognizing 
the increasingly urgent need for measures to protect the environment, including the 
decommissioning of energy installations and waste disposal, and for internationally-
agreed objectives and criteria for these purposes.”). 
 331.  See id. art. 19(3)(b) (defining “Environmental Impact” as any effect caused 
by a given activity on the environment, including “human health and safety, flora, 
fauna, soil, air, water, climate, landscape and historical monument”). 
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 Given the fact that renegotiating investment treaties is a lengthy 
process, however, some scholars and practitioners have proposed the 
adoption of a multilateral declaration to enhance the coherence 
between international investment law and the climate change 
regime.332 According to these authors, the multilateral declaration 
would clarify that international investment treaties do not constrain 
climate change measures enacted in good faith. As is well known, at 
the World Trade Organization, a similar declaration was adopted—
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health333—to clarify the interplay between the protection of 
intellectual property and public health. Yet, this has not prevented 
states from bringing a number of disputes on different aspects of that 
interplay. Therefore, it may be more appropriate for states—which 
are the masters of their treaties—to issue binding interpretations.334 
For instance, this has already been done in the context of NAFTA 
with regard to the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment 
clause.335 
B. De Lege Lata 
 This section examines the legal mechanisms that can help 
arbitrators adjudicate climate change-related disputes. While existing 
investment rules often do not explicitly address the complexities of 
climate change, they can be interpreted to take climate concerns into 
account in their operation. The section first addresses the question as 
to whether security exceptions could be interpreted in an evolutive 
manner so as to justify climate policies affecting investors’ rights. It 
then assesses whether  general treaty rules on hierarchy—namely lex 
                                                                                                                            
 332.  See Wolfgang Alschner & Elisabeth Tuerk, The Role of International 
Investment Agreements in Fostering Sustainable Development, in INVESTMENT LAW 
WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW—INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVE (2013) (providing a brief 
overview of recent UNCTAD research on the relation between international investment 
treaties and sustainable development). 
 333.  See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference of 9–14 November 
2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001).  
 334.  See generally Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty 
Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 179–225 (2010) (arguing 
that an overemphasis on states as respondents in investor–state disputes has 
diminished the states’ interpretive power in their capacity as treaty parties). 
 335.  See North American Free Trade Agreement Free Trade Commission, Notes 
of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, ¶ 2, July 31, 2001, http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA_interpr-en.asp [http://perma.cc/L6FB-PBT2] (archived 
Sept. 20, 2015) (stating, inter alia, that “the concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that 
which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment 
of aliens.”). 
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posterior derogat priori336 and lex specialis derogat generali—337 may 
be adequate to govern the interplay between climate change law and 
international investment law. It concludes considering how 
customary rules of treaty interpretation as restated by the Vienna 
Convention on Law of Treaties (VCLT) allow arbitrators to take other 
international law norms into account when interpreting investment 
treaties. 
 While most BITs do not have a general exception clause, some 
include security exceptions to protect the public order and essential 
security interests. Although some such clauses adopt an expressly 
military framing, and therefore would be inapposite to shield climate 
change measures,338 others adopt a looser wording, which may be 
susceptible of evolutionary interpretation. In other words, the term 
“security” could be interpreted in an evolutionary manner so as to 
include “climate security.” While some tribunals have interpreted the 
security exceptions in a restrictive fashion by relying on customary 
law,339 other tribunals have expanded the meaning of security to 
include phenomena in addition to and beyond military threats. 
Therefore, one may wonder whether such security exceptions may be 
interpreted to include climate security.  
 Is climate change a security issue? Admittedly, “the language of 
calamity, urgency [and crisis] . . . has pervaded discussions of climate 
change for . . . decades.”340 The Security Council expressed its concern 
that “possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, 
aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and 
security.”341 Climate change has been viewed as a “threat multiplier 
                                                                                                                            
 336.  See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 117, art. 30 
(governing “the rights and obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to 
the same subject-matter” and, “subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United 
Nations”, generally providing that newer treaties will prevail over older ones). 
 337.  See Rep. of the Study Group of the International Law Commission: 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, adopted by the International Law Commission at its 
Fifty-eighth Session and Submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the 
Commission’s Report Covering the Work of that Session, U.N. doc A/CN.4/L.682 (2006). 
at 2 (explaining that the concept lex specialis derogat legi generali is “a generally 
accepted technique of interpretation and conflict resolution in international law,” 
which indicates that “whenever two or more norms deal with the same subject matter, 
priority should be given to the norm that is more specific”).  
 338.  See, NAFTA art. 2012. 
 339.  See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005). 
 340.  Tomer Broude, Warming to Crisis: The Climate Change Law of Unintended 
Opportunity, INT’L L. FORUM, HEBREW U. JERUSALEM, 7 (2013). 
 341.  See Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Security 
Council, July 20, 2011, S/PRST/2011/15, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/% 
7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CC%20SPRST%202011%205.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/TJ84-QNTN] (archived Oct. 15, 2015) (also expressing concern that 
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which exacerbates existing . . . tensions and instability . . . 
threaten[ing] to overburden states and regions which are already 
fragile and conflict prone.”342 Global water wars and climate refugees 
are depicted as “security threats.”343 The President of the UN General 
Assembly recently described climate change as a threat “rivaled in its 
cataclysmic effects only by thermonuclear conflict.”344 However, while 
climate change is a “potentially disastrous” “long-term problem and 
process,” its “prospective and impending” nature,345 rightly or 
wrongly, could not be perceived as requiring an immediate action.  
 Certainly, in some cases, security exceptions have been 
interpreted extensively to include financial crisis. For instance in 
LG&E v. Argentina,346 the Arbitral Tribunal rejected the argument of 
the claimants that Article XI of the US–Argentina BIT should be 
interpreted narrowly.347 Article XI of the US–Argentina BIT provides: 
“This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of 
measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the 
fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its 
own essential security interests.”348 While the claimant contended 
that “Article XI is not applicable in the case of an economic crisis 
because the public order and essential security interests elements are 
intentionally narrow in scope, limited to security threats of a physical 
nature,”349 Argentina defended the measures it implemented “as 
necessary to maintain public order and protect its essential security 
interests,” contending that the financial crisis “constitute[d] a 
national emergency sufficient to invoke the protections of Article 
XI.”350 In particular, Argentina contended that the measures it had 
implemented were necessary to protect public order by pointing to 
“numerous reports of waves of sudden economic catastrophe, massive 
strikes involving millions of workers, fatal shootings, the shutdown of 
                                                                                                                            
“possible security implications of loss of territory of some States caused by sea-level-
rise may arise, in particular in small low-lying island States”). 
 342.  Climate Change and International Security, Paper from the High 
Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, S113/08, Mar. 
14, 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/ 
99387.pdf [http://perma.cc/9UUV-9HAX] (archived Oct. 15, 2015).  
 343.  See Broude, supra note 340, at 19–20. 
 344.  Vuk Jeremic, Address by President of the United Nations General 
Assembly to the Opening Ceremony of the High Level Segment of COP18/CMP8/ (Dec. 
4, 2012), https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/doha_nov_2012/statements/application/pdf/ 
04122012_cop18_hls_president_un_general_assembly.pdf [https://perma.cc/3447-AL82] 
(archived Oct. 15, 2015).  
 345.  Broude, supra note 340, at 4–5.  
 346.  LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
Decision on Liability (October 3, 2006). 
 347.  See id. ¶ 226.  
 348.  Id. ¶ 204. 
 349.  Id. ¶ 203. 
 350.  Id. ¶ 215. 
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schools, businesses, transportation, energy, banking and health 
services, demonstrations across the country, and a plummeting stock 
market, culminating in a ‘final massive social explosion’ in which five 
presidential administrations resigned within a month.”351  
 De lege lata, the International Law Commission (ILC) 
recommends a toolbox of techniques to deal with conflicting norms.352 
General treaty rules on hierarchy—namely lex posterior derogat 
priori353 and lex specialis derogat generali—354 may not be wholly 
adequate to govern the interplay between treaty regimes because the 
given bodies of law do not exactly overlap; rather, they have different 
scopes, aims, and objectives.355 
 However, this does not mean that climate law considerations are 
irrelevant. If the applicable law is domestic law that incorporates 
climate law, climate law considerations can be taken into account. 
Moreover, when interpreting a treaty, arbitrators can take account of 
other international obligations of the parties according to customary 
rules of treaty interpretation as restated by the Vienna Convention 
on Law of Treaties (VCLT).356 Pursuant to Article 31(3)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaty interpretation 
should take into account “any subsequent practice in the application 
of the treaty.” Moreover, pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the same 
Convention, “[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the 
context: […] any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties.” Therefore, this provision properly 
expresses the principle of systemic integration within the 
international legal system, indicating that treaty regimes are 
themselves creatures of international law.357 That is how the climate 
change international obligations of states can be considered in the 
adjudication of disputes before investment arbitral tribunals.  
 Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (MEAs) provisions 
have been used to interpret specific investment treaty standards. For 
instance, in the Chemtura v. Canada case,358 the Arbitral Tribunal 
                                                                                                                            
 351.  Id. ¶ 216. 
 352.  See Rep. of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, supra 
note 337.  
 353.  See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 118, art. 30 
(governing “the rights and obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to 
the same subject-matter” and, “subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United 
Nations”, generally providing that newer treaties will prevail over older ones). 
 354.  See Rep. of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, supra 
note 337, at 2.  
 355.  See Donald McRae, International Economic Law and Public International 
Law: The Past and the Future, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 627, 635 (2014). 
 356.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 118, art. 31. 
 357.  See Campbell McLachlan, The Principles of Systematic Integration and 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 279, 280 (2005). 
 358.  See Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 135 (Aug. 2, 2010). 
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expressly referred to a number of environmental treaties to evaluate 
the toxicity of a given chemical. In Parkerings v. Lithuania, the fact 
that the investment would have affected a World Heritage Site 
protected under the World Heritage Convention was a sufficient 
condition for distinguishing the project from another, thus precluding 
the claim of discrimination.359 The Tribunal took the relevant MEA 
into account to deny state liability for an alleged discrimination.360 
 In other cases, however, fragmentation and increasingly narrow 
specialization sometimes produced awards that suffered from failing 
to situate their analyses within the wider legal or contextual frame of 
reference. For instance, in Myers v. Canada, Myers, a U.S. company 
engaged in Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB) waste disposal brought 
an investment treaty arbitration against Canada for its ban on 
exports of hazardous PCB waste from Canada to the United States. 
The Arbitral Tribunal held that Canada’s export ban was designed to 
favor Canadian waste companies and did not sufficiently take into 
account the fact that Canada was a party to the Basel Convention on 
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal.361 The Basel Convention prohibits the import and 
export of hazardous wastes from and to countries that are not a party 
to the Convention. The United States was not a party to the 
Convention at the time of Canada’s ban. Therefore, this should have 
been taken into account by the Arbitral Tribunal when considering 
the legitimacy of the export ban.  
 The interaction between international investment law and other 
sets of law raises the question as to whether the former is a “self-
contained regime.” The increased proliferation of treaties and 
specialization of different branches of international law make some 
overlapping between the latter unavoidable. However, “international 
investment law has its roots in general international law, despite its 
undeniable specificity,”362 and  
[it] is not a self-contained closed legal system limited to provide for substantive 
material rules of direct applicability, but it has to be envisaged within a wider 
juridical context in which rules from other sources are integrated through 
                                                                                                                            
 359.  See Parkerings-Compagniet v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/08, 
Award, ¶ 369 (Sept. 11, 2007).  
 360.  See id. ¶ 392 (“The historical and archaeological preservation and 
environmental protection could be and in this case were a justification for the refusal of 
the [claimant’s] Project.”). 
 361.  See generally Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, adopted Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 
U.N.T.S. 126, 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989). 
 362.  Alain Pellet, The Case Law of the ICJ in Investment Arbitration, 28 ICSID 
FOREIGN INV. L. REV. 223, 240 (2014). 
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implied incorporation methods, or by direct reference to certain supplementary 
rules, whether of international law character or of domestic law nature.363  
X. CONCLUSION 
 Climate is a global public good that defies traditional notions of 
territorial sovereignty. Climate is a common and shared resource that 
is both beyond and within the jurisdiction of every state. Because 
climate change is a common concern of mankind and can affect 
populations regardless of state boundaries, a regime complex governs 
various aspects of the same. To a large extent, various institutions 
are recognizing the linkages between climate mitigation and the 
promotion of foreign direct investments and beginning to formulate 
responses; and this development is encouraging.  
 What effect can international investment law have on the 
current efforts to mitigate climate change? The answer to this 
question is double-edged. On the one hand, international investment 
law and arbitration may have a positive effect, encouraging 
investments in renewable technologies and preventing governments 
from retreating from previous commitments. On the other hand, 
international investment law and arbitration may have a negative 
effect on climate mitigation, especially if the state adopts stricter 
environmental regulations, which can affect investments in the 
energy sector. In fact, foreign investors can challenges such 
regulatory measures before arbitral tribunals claiming that they 
violate investment treaty provisions.  
 This Article has contributed to mapping the interplay between 
foreign direct investment and climate change, exploring the recent 
boom of investment treaty arbitrations in the field. Foreign investors 
can and have filed claims against the host state alleging that energy 
policies adopted by the latter amount to a disguised discrimination 
against their investment or other breaches of investment treaty 
provisions. Two types of disputes have emerged: the first type 
concerns the dramatic regulatory change governing renewable energy 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The emergency measures 
undertaken in response to the global financial crisis have triggered a 
wave of investment disputes against states for potential breaches of 
investment treaty provisions, due to the negative impact of 
emergency measures on investments in the renewable energy sector. 
The second type of disputes relates to the adoption of climate change 
mitigation measures, which can be perceived as affecting the 
economic value of foreign investments in other sectors. The Article 
                                                                                                                            
 363.  Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri 
Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award, ¶ 21 (June 27, 1990). 
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has also offered some legal tools for reconciling energy policies with 
other economic and noneconomic interests.  
 While arbitral tribunals are not the best forum to adjudicate 
climate-related disputes, due to their limited mandate and their 
uneven consideration of environmental concerns in the past, they can 
contribute to global climate governance. Investment treaty 
arbitration can provide private actors a useful tool to access justice at 
the international level and to obtain compensation in case of 
mistreatment by the host state. At the same time, investment treaty 
arbitration should not be perceived as a tool to enforce other treaty 
regimes, as this was not the intention of its founders and could raise 
more legitimacy concerns than it helps to solve.  
 Investing in clean energy can mitigate climate change, bring 
significant economic benefits, and contribute to the commonwealth. 
Yet, this Article has shown that while foreign direct investment and 
climate change mitigation are capable of mutually reinforcing each 
other, the different branches of international law governing this 
interplay have different underlying philosophies and priorities. 
Therefore, equilibrium should be sought between climate change 
mitigation and foreign direct investments in order to reinforce 
possible synergies in each of these regimes. Whether this is possible 
in international investment law and arbitration remains to be seen. 
Certainly, some redrafting and appropriate interpretation of the 
relevant investment treaties would allow for the consideration of the 
public interest. 
